Jerusalem

The Old City

The Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications

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Jerusalem
The Old City
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Introduction
The Old City of Jerusalem
Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications

Control of the Old City: Core of an Issue

One can arrive at the importance of governance in the Old City by the following process of rational reduction. The Middle East Crisis has many origins, but nearly all agree that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a central factor. Within that conflict, the Jerusalem issue features quite prominently and is widely viewed as perhaps the main obstacle to a resolution. Within the Jerusalem issue, the core question of sovereignty and control of the Old City is the most salient. Thus, many believe that a successful solution to the seemingly narrow issue of Old City governance, even if provisional, will have a broader impact far beyond the ancient city’s walls. Hence the object of the present study is to examine the state of the Old City and to explore possible scenarios for its future—some threatening, some promising. Ultimately we will look for the most feasible scenario or intervention to avoid an escalation of hostilities, which we believe is an otherwise inevitable outcome of the current status quo.

The execution of geo-political and administrative solutions in contested areas may proceed from the broad, macro level of the general regional conflict and move to the micro urban level, even down to the local scene of the Haram Al-Sharif Mosque. Or, as we suggested in our opening, the process can move from the micro level, the Old City, and upwards to the macro conflict. An additional example of the latter would be a cultural-religious micro approach that would begin with the Haram Al-Sharif Mosque issue and move toward very broad, almost abstract macro levels. The interplay of the components of the processes is represented in the figure below.

Figure 1: Components of the Conflict and Solutions for the Old City.
Getting to Today

The Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 dramatically altered the control and reality of the Old City. The Moroccan Quarter was eradicated and the Jewish Quarter greatly expanded. Then, for a few years, Israel did not attempt to enforce further reformulations of the space and identity of the ancient community. But the calm was broken in the mid-1980s by Israeli efforts to Judaize the Islamic and Christian quarters. While the former prime minister Ariel Sharon launched this policy, Ehud Olmert, former mayor of Jerusalem and also former prime minister, accelerated the process of domination and hegemony by supporting extremist groups of Jewish settlers in the Old City and its surroundings. The goal was to expand Israeli territorial and political sovereignty and to fulfill the Zionist vision of transforming the Old City into the heart of the Israeli capital and the cornerstone of Jewish identity. Today, the Old City of Jerusalem is at the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The peace process began with the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. This constituted a turning point in the Israeli policy on Jerusalem. The much touted quasi-autonomy granted to Palestinians, which seemingly gave them control of their cultural, service, economic, religious, and political institutions, was not granted to Jerusalem but only to the heavily populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hence, after Oslo, East Jerusalem, which had been the metropolitan center for Palestinian services, communication and economy and played religious and national roles for both Christian and Muslim Palestinians, no longer functioned as a capital. The Palestinian National Authority, which after all, is responsible for the life of Palestinians, was not allowed to administer within Jerusalem, and the status of the city was excluded from any interim agreement; indeed, Israel refused any serious negotiations regarding the city’s future. The effect of those actions was to isolate Palestinian Jerusalem from its natural extended hinterland and from its spatial and functional continuity and interaction with the other regions of the West Bank. The disjunction of the city from its surroundings reached an apex with the construction of the Separation Wall.

The isolation had a negative impact on the city in general and the Old City in particular. Jerusalem could no longer effectively serve as the Palestinian center for the entire West Bank. In addition, the wall precipitated a migration into East Jerusalem and the Old City of thousands of Palestinians who moved from the neighborhoods and suburbs that were cut off from the city by the barrier. This influx exacerbated the already poor socio-economic life of the city. East Jerusalem and its Old City witnessed a perceptible deterioration in the quality of urban life and in service levels. For example, there were drastic declines in health and sanitation services, a further worsening of housing conditions, a rise in unemployment and poverty levels, massive overcrowding, and a deterioration in the quality of private and social services, as well as increases in family violence, drug addiction and drug-trafficking.

The failure of Camp David II negotiations (2000) and the subsequent failure of the Israeli Labor Party in the 2001 elections (which effectively cancelled the progress made in the Taba negotiations that followed Camp David) constituted another turning point, as Israel resumed the implementation of a number of plans to consolidate and enhance its security domination and spatial hegemony within the Old City. For the first time since the occupation, Israel sought to set up a detailed plan for the Old City. It informed the international bodies, UNESCO in particular, of its execution of unilateral decisions that had excluded any role for Palestinian, Arab, Islamic or western parties. We can say that the peace demarche, which excluded the Jerusalem issue from the negotiation table, has increased Israel’s domination and has accelerated settlement expansion, and it has abetted the incorporation of surrounding settlements into Israel by the construction of the Separation Wall. These
maneuvers effectively destroyed Palestinian space and insulated East Jerusalem and the Old City from their immediate surroundings and from the West Bank regions. This realized Israel’s goal of enhancing its domination and powers over Jerusalem, particularly with respect to the Old City and its surrounding Holy Basin. Together, these latter areas make up four square kilometers. In Hebrew lore they constitute the center of the Jewish patrimony and, in addition to the Old City, encompass the ancient City of David in Silwan, the Jewish cemeteries in Mount of Olives, and Mt. Zion (the Dawoudiya Quarter until 1948) as well as many areas adjacent to the ancient walls of the Old City.

Scope of the Study

This study has been produced by the International Peace and Cooperation Center in Jerusalem, an independent Palestinian NGO that focuses on urban studies of Jerusalem and the broader Jerusalem metropolitan area. The study is the first to center in detail on the Old City.

Chapter One sketches the historical development of the Old City and describes its physical layout as well as its demographic, socioeconomic and administrative status. Additionally, significant attention is given to the nature of the Old City’s existing space, its purposes, urban functions and infrastructure services.

Chapter Two studies the impact of creeping urbanization and gentrification in the Old City and its surroundings. It views those “rehabilitating” forces as a subversive effort to replace the multicultural Arab character of the Old City with essentially a Jewish culture. The chapter assays the urban deterioration of East Jerusalem and its center, the Old City and identifies the factors underlying the decline. It also describes the existing conditions and experience in the Old City, the prospect of revival, and an evaluation of proposals, including international intervention, to bring positive transformations to Jerusalem and to its functions. Statistical data capturing existing conditions in the Old City are presented in Appendix One.

Chapter Three provides an update on the matrix of the Israeli control in the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, and it also discusses the methods by which Jewish settlers take over Palestinian properties. An updated survey of the Jewish settler presence in the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City is presented in Appendix Two.

Chapter Four reviews possible scenarios of geopolitical solutions for the future of the Old City, including the functional urban and spatial implications of each scenario. The review includes scenarios developed by Israeli and Palestinian think tanks, JIIS and IPCC respectively. While the scenarios are preliminary projections that require further research and field work, the chapter views the continuation of the status quo scenario as the worst case scenario. Many of the scenarios offer some limited improvement, but the suggested optimal or best case Old City scenario features Israeli and Palestinian cooperation and integration under an international regime.
Chapter One

Challenges in Administering the Old City
**Challenges in Administering the Old City**

There are many reasons that the Old City problem has remained intractable, but surely near the top of the list is the lack of trust between the two contending parties. Forty-plus years of occupation and two intifadas have taken a toll on the credibility of the respective parties and have made it difficult for either side to extend good will and the benefit of the doubt to “the other.” Beginning in 1947, over the years many proposals have been made for an international third party approach. While we will not critique individual proposals here, the goal of the chapter is to analyze the generic idea of an international approach in the context of contemporary data on the nature of life and circumstances in the Old City. We examine the governance and functional challenges that would face an international administration, mindful that most of these challenges would also be faced by a Palestinian or Israeli or bi-national administration.

More specifically, this chapter offers an analysis that reviews:

- The challenges and consequences arising from ceding functional control of the Old City and its environs to an international authority
- The impact that such a decision would have on the development of the Old City
- Methods that would have to be developed to relate to Old City internal neighborhoods, to manage its infrastructure, and to interface with its civil society
- Suggestions on its relationship to surrounding external areas (such as the Holy Basin) and to non-residents, particularly guests and tourists

Inherent in the analysis is an emphasis on land use issues that would face an international or any Old City administration seeking to improve life in the quarters of this ancient community. The data which underpin our analysis are available in Appendix One.

**The Physical Structure of the Old City**

The surface area within the walls of the Old City is approximately 900 dunums (.91 sq.k.), or approximately 225 acres, an area somewhat less than one square kilometer. Today it is divided into four ethnic/religious quarters: Muslim, Jewish, Armenian, and Christian. Within the latter, neighborhoods are based along sectarian (e.g. Greek Orthodox and Latin Patriarchy) affiliation. The Muslim Quarter is Sunni; the Jewish quarter is a mixture of religious and secular families. And within the four areas there is a gradation in the social structure, the infrastructure, and the roads network. When viewed closely, the Old City is not a homogenous community, but rather has the complexity one associates with urban life. Map 1 charts the layout of the Old City today.

The Old City has had its current configuration since Ottoman rule, during which time the wall was built and the city boundaries set. The first municipality was created inside the walls in 1863. Soon after, the built-up areas outside the walls were added to the municipal administration, these became neighborhoods such as Al Musara, Sheikh Jarrah, and Bab As Sahira.

The Old City’s walls constitute its physical boundaries, and its gates provide contiguity with the surrounding neighborhoods. The walls are the signature structure of the entire city, a key element of the city landscape, and are a major tourist attraction. The height of the Old City walls reach 17 meters in some areas, and they have an average height of 11.6 meters. They are two meters thick in most places and they are interrupted by 34 towers and 11 gates, four of which are closed. It is fair to say that its scale and architectural style give a special image to the city.
Map 1: Old City Quarters
During the British Mandate (1918-1948), Jerusalem’s boundaries expanded to include a western area where a Jewish concentration had developed, as well as several new Palestinian neighborhoods in the east and south. In 1948, as a consequence of the war, Jerusalem was divided physically and geo-politically into two municipalities—Israeli and Palestinian. The latter section was placed under Jordanian control, which lasted from 1948 to 1967. Originally, the Palestinian area of the city included East Jerusalem and the Old City. During the Jordanian era, the Palestinian Jerusalem territory expanded further to include villages and neighborhoods east and north of the Old City. Jerusalem’s boundaries assumed their current approximate configuration after the Israeli occupation of 1967, although there are differences between the Israeli and Palestinian definitions of those boundaries.

Most of the Old City’s buildings go back to the Ayyubid era (12th to 14th centuries), the Mamluk era (14th to 16th centuries), or the Ottoman period (16th century to 1917). The only significant modification to the urban fabric occurred after the occupation of 1967, when the Jewish Quarter was created on the demolished area that had supported the Ash Sharaf and the Al Maghariba (Moroccan) neighborhoods. Effectively, this expanded the Jewish area from approximately 20 dunums to over 120 dunums; this six-fold expansion gives the Jewish community 13.6% of the Old City terrain. That change reflected Israeli control and altered the Old City’s social structure.

Before the Israeli occupation of 1967, a collection of 23 neighborhoods constituted the Old City. They were named in the Ottoman era, and most of them bore the names of the families or groups that inhabited them. However, under Israeli control, the Old City was divided strictly along religious and ethnic lines; this went against the reality of the organic mixed development that had taken place over centuries.

The physical structure of the Old City and its surroundings is the result of a historical development of social, cultural, economic, geopolitical and migratory factors, as well as the evolution of construction and architectural practices. When functional and administrative changes are contemplated, the physical structure perspective or analysis should be broken down to the smallest units of the Old City in order to understand the basis on which it was built and to better determine what administrative approaches should be used to develop the specific space in a way that assures its belonging and connections to its surroundings. This must be the approach, even if it is the case that the Old City and its units may be passing through a transitional period during which the major parties look for a solution to the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

In short, ignoring the concepts, values, and functional social components that have shaped the physical structure of the Old City means that one runs the risk of adopting solutions that do not contribute to the stability of the community. While defining the physical borders of administrative units is very important, it is not enough. Equally important are the physical structures of building components, the land use, and the relationship of the units to areas within and outside the walls.

**Protection of the Old City’s Layers and Spaces**

Land use categories canopy most of the actions and policies of urban administrations. The city administers through such rubrics as residential buildings, parcelization, commercial districts, religious locations, public institutions, open spaces, public services, infrastructure, zoning and permitting processes. These concepts order the horizontal or surface layer of the community. However, in viewing the needs of a historical area of universal value, these topics are inadequate. The Old City requires a more sensitive analysis.

**Upper and Lower Layers**

Understanding the horizontal divisions of the community is never sufficient for effective planning and control; there is a vertical dimension that must also be reckoned with. Over the centuries, the Old City has accumulated many layers; in all, the city has been demolished eighteen times by natural and human forces.
Dealing with the existing surface layer that contains the residents, their housing, the community services, the infrastructure and the economy is only part of the answer. Underlying these are the history, narratives, and values of the residents. There is also the archeological and symbolic importance of lower layers that refer to the right to own the space and to govern it.

An intelligent administration must deal with the visible physical structure in parallel with the invisible domain of symbolic values in the minds and memories of the people, for these have a functional utility in their lives in the Old City.

It is then important to understand that the lower layers affect the upper layers; they empower historical sites; they add symbolic value to spiritual spaces and, of course, they support the structures of upper layer buildings. Intelligent administration will assure that rehabilitation and renovation of upper layer buildings take the lower layers into consideration—avoiding demolition and destruction. Current assaults by ethno-political forces have caused a deterioration of the lower levels. Israel, it must be said, ignored these considerations when it developed new buildings in the Jewish Quarter on the remains of Palestinian buildings it had demolished in the years since 1967.

In addition to sensitivity to the lower levels, the administration must recognize that the upper layer may also have many levels. Floors have been added on to existing properties and new multi-floor structures have been built that exceed the height of the Old City walls—even though British, Jordanian, and Israeli laws have prohibited such structures and modifications. In addition, upper level problems have occurred at the hands of private initiatives in the Old City. For example, the floors that have been added often employ materials and styles incompatible with the rest of the structure or with the surroundings. This corruption of the Old City’s appearance is the result of the political, social, and cultural distortions which are still on-going in the area today.

**The Old City’s Courtyards**

The physical structure of the courtyards is complicated by the social structure. The courtyards (hosh) are, like the buildings that surround them, built on top of many layers; and they may have been owned by various extended families over the years or clans with dissimilar social and economic backgrounds. The administration of these courtyards requires an understanding of their physical and social past.

**Urban Architectural and Spatial Masses**

Inside the Old City, there are various urban masses that are diverse in style and use. Some lack open spaces while others have open areas surrounded by private housing, religious buildings, or public institutions. The outer elevation of many of these buildings is for public use, although the buildings themselves are private. The administrative authority must be able to distinguish between private inner elevations and public elevations that rise along public paths and between public open spaces and private spaces which cannot be used by all inhabitants and visitors.

**The Old City and its Surroundings**

The Old City is part of its surrounding urban fabric, one that has emerged organically. Some of the surroundings developed in parallel with the Old City; others developed later, but have since been integrated with the Old City functionally and symbolically. The question arises, how can there be a natural relationship between the Old City and its surroundings in the event that it is separated arbitrarily by the imposition of a special corpus separatum international control regime, one that is independent of the local and regional authorities of the surrounding space?

The roles and responsibilities of the Old City administration and the various surrounding authorities should therefore be identified. But problem areas will remain, since there are many services that cannot be provided within the Old City, such as public parking, infrastructure networks, roads and entertainment areas. There
Figure 1.1: This kitchen scene reveals the typical substandard living conditions in the Old City.

are also several infrastructure components that are linked with those outside the Old City and are administered by external authorities.

The Historical Basin
We advise against the temptation to rigidly define the basin area and warn against approaching it via a contiguous physical frame. It is best understood as a value frame that surrounds the Old City. It should not be allowed to put functional pressure on the Old City or to mute its physical identity.

Jerusalem Society in the Old City
The society of the Old City is divided into three religious groups: Muslim, Christian, and Jewish, and within those there are sub-groups with diverse cultural backgrounds. Important divisions among the sub-groups are clans, extended families, and other informal social associations. Collectively, these religious and social groupings create a mosaic that manifests an urbanization process moving between tradition, modernity, and globalization.

Identity
Lacking a nation-state, creating a Palestinian identity is problematic. This is also reflected at the urban level. The geo-political changes that have occurred in the Jerusalem area have caused social alienation from the city and created additional identities which run through the society. Some of these are based on the nuclear family, the extended family, the neighborhood, or the place of origin before immigrating to the Old City. Thus, in lieu of identification with the Old City, many see themselves as of a family, a clan, a diwan, a neighborhood or even of some other city or village. For example, Hebronites who have moved to the
Old City still keep their relationship and identity with the “mother city”, despite having lived in the Old City for years or sometimes centuries. Residents in some Old City neighborhoods maintain an identity with lands outside Palestine, such as East Africa, Afghanistan, Armenia and Morocco. They came to Jerusalem for religious reasons and have added behaviors and traditions from their mother country to Jerusalem society, while at the same time maintaining strong feelings of identity with their mother land.

In short, in the present situation, a homogeneous Jerusalem identity does not exist and is in reality not possible. The administration must realize that it is serving a mosaic society. This mosaic arose in the absence of a central, organized rule. It also arose from the organic growth of the society which preserved traditions and informal rules of behavior and social relationships, some of which derive from other cities or even other countries.

**Religions**

In the Old City there are 13 mosques, 70 churches, and 24 synagogues and Jewish religious schools— together, they constitute 280 dunums of the Old City. Holy site locations are presented in Map 2.

As noted earlier, Muslims in the Old City are Sunni. However, within that broad framework they follow various scholars and belong to different clans, tribes, and societies that have distinguishing behaviors. This diversity has led to the development of different political parties and the establishment of diverse informal organizations based on various identities. Many observers believe that participation or “belonging” in these structures extracts strength from the traditional framework of the religion.

Christians in the Old City are divided into many groups as well; here, too, sect, social level, family,
Map 2: Holy and Historical Sites in the Old City
clan, and place of origin are important distinctions. Perhaps the clearest difference to be noted is between the Christian Quarter, which harbors Jesuits, Latinate Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists and Greek Orthodox, and the relatively homogeneous Armenian Quarter.

The Jewish Quarter is also not homogenous, but divided among Jewish religious and secular groups, as well as small groups which follow a particular rabbi and therefore adhere to different social and cultural traditions. The traditional categories of sects (Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform) do not represent much of the religious life of the Jewish Quarter.

Map 3a depicts the Jewish Quarter and identifies Jewish settler residences and facilities in other quarters. Map 3b shows the Jewish Quarter before 1948 and after 1967.

**Traditional Law and Informal Social Structures**

Tribal and informal mediation and arbitration laws (oral traditional laws) dominate in the Old City. Most of the Palestinian inhabitants are Muslims who have a Hebronite origin, which includes a clear orientation toward a strong patriarchal, traditional society. Most of the community involvement in the public life of the Old City is based on social and family relations. Typically, social and economic disputes are solved by mediators working with the heads of families, especially in big families and clans. There is no formal mediation committee that works exclusively for the Old City. Some of the informal mediators cooperate with the Israeli police through the public services centers. They are paid Palestinian employees, who are known in their community. Through them, Israeli control is exercised. There are also other informal mediation groups who do not work with the Israeli police; they are not organized, but become involved in mediating and solving conflicts when called upon.

Clans are very common in the Old City, and no significant dispute is resolved without their involvement—whether the conflict is over ownership issues, economic or social matters. Custom in the Old City recognizes public rights and private rights. Private rights are resolved within or between the families. The resolution of public rights issues, on the other hand, cannot be mediated by the informal system. For example, a resident who is in prison is under Israeli control, and nothing can be done about it. Also, the traditional mediation system is part of the competition for power in Jerusalem. If families can resolve issues among themselves, it contributes to Palestinian sovereignty and diminishes Israeli power. Within the context of the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict, each side wants to maximize its authority; and in East Jerusalem this is not achieved with tanks or shelling, but with social sovereignty.

The Israeli police seek to involve themselves in the minutest issues of the inhabitants, including domestic quarrels and family disputes, in order to assert their power in the daily lives of Palestinians. In problems that involve the mediators employed by the police, the police will still intrude. They do this somewhat indirectly but nevertheless visibly. They always stand by as observers, simply to establish their presence—normally without saying a word but becoming involved if needed. These
Map 3a: Settler Expansion in the Old City*
Map 3b: Expansion of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City

Jewish Presence in the Old City before 1948

Jewish Presence in the Old City after 1967
CHAPTER ONE

paid mediators are elders who are or were at some point prominent members of society, and who are now employed to do the same work they did privately before. As mentioned earlier, there are also mediators who refuse to serve the Israeli police and who do the same type of problem-resolution work without any compensation from the Israeli government; they consider their efforts to be work for God.

Diwans

Some Palestinian families have organized themselves in a diwan (an association or forum) to shape their identity and manage their affiliation with the Old City. Hundreds of diwans have been established in Palestine in the last 25 years and have become structures, not only to provide services, but also to gain social power. Lacking formal political and communal representation in the Jerusalem governmental structure, there has been an increase in such informal custom-based structures. They have proven their efficiency and ability to initiate activities and implement changes on the ground and for the people.

In the Old City, there are three major family diwans: Qutteineh, Hijazi and Dkeidek. The Diwan Qutteineh has its origins in ancient Jerusalem. The Hijazi and Dkeidek families originated in Hebron. We will detail two of these Old City diwans below.

The Qutteineh roots in Jerusalem go back to the 14th century. Over the intervening seven centuries many of the family members emerged as prominent contributors to Jerusalem’s culture and society. They have served in scientific posts, as senior managers of large commercial concerns, in religious offices, and several have excelled in the arts, most notably in music and poetry. The Qutteinehs also established a library in the early 19th century, a project spearheaded by Alain Sulaiman bin Mohammed bin Abdulrahmen, known also as Ibn Qutteineh. The library was situated near the Damascus Gate, generally considered the main entrance to the Old City. It contained important manuscripts, rare books, significant treatises on nature, astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, and religion. The library was destroyed during the 1948 war, the Nakbar.

The Qutteineh’s gathering place is at the “Al-Diwan” in the Al-Tuteh neighborhood of the Old
Figure 1.5: Members of the Dkeidek diwan voting at a recent meeting.

City. On the first Friday of each month 20 to 30 representatives from each family branch meet there. They are organized into three committees: cultural, property, and the family trust (waqf). During a general session of the whole, typically the following may be discussed: important matters and reports arising from the committees; important personal problems of any member; various family and property issues. The Al-Diwan halls are also used for weddings and funerals. Nowadays members of the family are seeking to restore some of the diwan’s lost traditions and to raise its visibility in the community. They have created a Qutteineh family website and have begun publishing a magazine oriented toward the activities of their children.

Before coming to Hebron and thence to Jerusalem, the Dkeidek family is of Kurdish origin, from the Tuktuk Hill in Kurdistan. They migrated to Palestine centuries ago. The family follows a Bedouin clan or informal tribal system. They established their diwan in 1987 and elected seven of its registered members to the original executive committee in 1988. The committee later increased to nine members. The diwan is located in the Old City, because that is the birth place of most of the family members today, and that choice heightens their Palestinian identity and existence within the city. It also lends legitimacy to them as a Jerusalemite family that has existed in the city for 500 years. Regardless of this background, by the established norms of Jerusalem they are still considered Hebronites. Their diwan building is about 120 square meters, and it is located within the area of the Old City walls in the Hutta Gate neighborhood. It is very close to Burj Al Laqlaq where an Israeli settlement is planned.

The Diwan Dkeidek executive committee was elected as an implementing body that oversees family interests and implements family decisions. With time, and as a result of the death of older members, the membership has become younger (most are under age 50) and the role of the committee has become service-oriented as well.

Services and functions performed by the Dkeidek family diwan through its executive committee include: sustaining the family unity, creating a fund for the family, supervising contributions to and participation in family events (parties,
funerals), arranging family funerals, administering loans, collecting donations, holding family events (graduations, Eids and feasts), issuing a family magazine that reports on family events and committee decisions, solving social disputes (internal and external), and providing individual loans. In some cases, they organize donations and financial help for family members in need. The diwan managed the entire process of obtaining the permits and building its headquarters for the family in the Old City (the permit alone required twelve years to secure).

There are 500 registered members in the Dkeidek diwan; every working male member is required to pay five Jordanian Dinars each month, and only paying members are eligible for services that the diwan provides. The committee holds regularly scheduled meetings to discuss family issues, as well as emergency meetings when needed. It has files and registers that include the details of different events of the family and a record of members who contribute to the diwan fund. The diwan also sends periodic personal reports to all individuals with their updated accounts in the family fund.

Based on a family decision, the diwan building is used, essentially, only for family matters. Rarely have the Dkeideks offered its use for events sponsored by surrounding families, nor for open public events, although it can be used to distribute gifts and presents during the Eids and on other religious occasions. It is registered as a Waqf – a family trust—not as a public association. If it were used regularly by the public it would be considered a public space, which would necessitate permits from the municipality. The family wants to avoid issues with the Israeli authorities and to remain independent of political affiliations. Even so, the family considers itself an active body that contributes to political issues in the city. This includes their support for Sheikh Raed Salah, who formed the “Families loyal to Al Aqsa Mosque”. But the Dkeidek family diwan building is best viewed as a meeting point, rather than as an active community center. Part of the diwan mission is to protect the family, especially against efforts by the Israeli settler movement to take over the building.

**The Social Mix**

There is substantial ethnic mixing within the Old City: some Christians reside in the Muslim Quarter, some Muslims live among the Christians, and there is Jewish representation in other quarters—such as on the border between the Jewish and Muslim Quarters. Also, several yeshivas and many Israeli settler homes can be found in the Muslim Quarter. In all, Jews occupy 20 dunums in the Palestinian quarters and have innumerable Jewish settlement points throughout the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City. Evidence of the mixing is further illustrated by the fact that there are 11 Christian churches and monasteries and eight Jewish religious schools in the Muslim Quarter; in the Christian Quarter there are six mosques. While much of the ethnic mixing is a historical and organic phenomenon within the development of the Old City, the more recent Jewish settlement points in other quarters is viewed as an attempt at colonization or as an effort to establish total Israeli sovereignty throughout the Old City. (See Chapter Three.)

Managing the Old City requires a comprehensive understanding of its transformation from a mosaic society into one that is diverse and able to function within a formal civil society framework. The administration of such diversity is not easy and cannot proceed effectively without the support of social representatives, religious leaders, informal leaders, and institutional representatives—all of whom have an important role to play in reaching geo-political solutions and achieving social transformation. And this must be stressed: imposing an international administration by western countries will be viewed as a diminishing or weakening of the Muslim society and of the Islamic countries represented in the Old City. There must be a high level of participation of Islamic nations and voices, including those of Palestinians or the international administration will be rejected.
Population Density

Population density in the Old City is another problem that complicates creating a successful administration. This is the result of geo-political factors; some of these are rights to residency policies, population “transfers”, building permitting processes and an acute housing shortage. The Old City population of 36,000 shares the 400 dunums that make up the residential area, generating a population density of 90 persons per dunum, or 90 persons per ¼ acre! Even if one uses the entire Old City area as the base of calculation, it yields a population density of 40 persons per dunum. Map 4 and Table 1.1 present the comparative density data of the Old City areas.

Since 1967, the population has increased from 23,000 to 36,965—an increase 60%. This rapid growth has caused the following:

1. An increase in the density within residential units, meaning more people in each unit and more people in residential areas in general
2. Increases in residential spaces through private renovation initiatives, the building of temporary structures and the development of household courtyard spaces and other open areas. Much of this development is, in the Israeli administrators’ eyes, illegal
3. The demolishing of old buildings and the erection of new structures, most notably in the Jewish Quarter
4. Renovations sponsored by civil and housing associations in an effort to absorb new and returning inhabitants
5. Confiscation of Palestinian houses in Christian and Muslim Quarters by Jewish settlers

Private and Public Space

Generally, there are three recognized types of space:

1. Public space: used by citizens and visitors
2. Semi-public/Semi-private space: used by residents but not completely under either public or private administration
3. Private space: privately owned

The key elements to understanding space, then, are authority and ownership.

Authority

Any administrative authority coming into the Old City will need firstly to establish a department that is charged with registering lands and housing, as well as resolving land and building disputes. Family law conflicts should be approached through the religious laws; Muslims and Christians each have their own system.

In the Old City there is considerable confusion in the areas of responsibilities, roles, and duties. This lack of clarity has resulted in a deterioration in the quality of services provided and in the maintenance of infrastructure; in some instances, it has even led to the destruction of resources. In our opinion, once duties, responsibilities, and rights are defined, trust can be generated that will produce stability, an efficient and fair tax system and the improvement of public spaces.

Secondly, an incoming administration should...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density (Person/dunum)</th>
<th>Area - (dunum)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Population Count</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81.40</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>71.81</td>
<td>26,544</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>14.72</td>
<td>5,442</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.45 (ave.)</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36,965</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JIIS 2007
Map 4: Population Density in the Old City (Person/Donum)
recognize that a significant part of the problem in managing the Old City is the conflict between public space authorities (the Israelis) and most of the users (i.e. the Palestinians). The latter have no trust in the authorities, and indeed avoid relating with them except when absolutely necessary for fear that their semi-private and private spaces may come under Israeli control.

Thirdly, there is often confusion or disagreement about ownership. Indeed, we would urge an international administrator to give high priority to a detailed survey of the Old City to identify ownership(s). This will be a sensitive issue for residents, many of whom will fear that the survey is a ruse to collect occupational or residency rights information as a prelude to confiscation. Clearly, trust will need to be established in order to gain their cooperation.

Further, an incoming functional international authority also would have to give priority to determining public areas by separating them from semi-private areas, such as areas administered by religious organizations, local organizations, families/clans and informal organizations. Examples of public spaces include: roads, public open spaces, public and governmental organizations, service centers, the walls of the city and the surrounding open spaces.

Ownership
Part of the confusion in the Old City arises from ownership issues. Primarily, it is difficult to define ownership there because of real estate laws, difficulties in determining borders and lot lines, administrative rules, the distinguishing of private from public spaces and vice versa, and appointing duties and authority.

Trust and Church Ownership
The Islamic Trust, which represents almost a quarter of the Old City, includes public, private and family trusts. Each has a manager who administers according to Sharia (i.e. Islamic law). The Christian sects also have trusts.

The Islamic Trust includes religious areas (Haram Al-Sharif), empty spaces, public areas, private areas with public functions (e.g., schools), and residential/commercial buildings, (e.g., the Qatteen Market and Dar Al Aytam school).

Family trusts includes those that are held by a family and passed down by inheritance. Trust rules restrict the sale of such property and control any significant modifications to it. The Al-Khalidi Library is one example of this.

The Islamic Trust is not only an administrative organization, as a religious entity it is responsible for the employees of all Muslim religious organizations. It is also an active political, economic and social force in the community with great symbolic value. Trust ownership of any type cannot be sold, exchanged or have its ownership changed except in coordination with the Islamic Trust. Ownership by various trusts sometimes covers an entire property, sometimes only part. Therefore, any international body that would deal with private owners must coordinate its actions with the Islamic trust.

Church properties are a similar case. Churches may own buildings for worship, monasteries, residential and commercial facilities, schools and even open areas. They are administered by a sect’s patriarchs, or bishops or other religious offices—and some are not local Palestinian operations. An international administrator will frequently have to coordinate policies and actions with the administrators of the churches.

Religious Areas
Religious areas are considered as “owned by God.” They cannot be disturbed or dealt with in the same ways as other zones. The Haram Al-Sharif, for example, is perceived as being owned by all Muslims and is a highly sensitive area. Any change in administration, ownership or confiscation will be viewed as an act of occupation. As such an international presence will not be accepted. Religious sites occupy 272 dunams (almost one-third) of the Old City. The system of control for the sites needs to be developed by creating a program that provides coordination for the needs of the sites inside and outside of the city walls to ensure
safety for the worshipers, pilgrims and tourists.

State Ownership
State property consists of:
1. Public streets
2. Confiscated lands and estates expropriated under the “Confiscation for Public Use Order of 1948”. For example, the Al Maghariba neighborhood in the Old City and the 116 dunums claimed for expanding the Wailing Wall
3. Land and estates confiscated under the Absentee Owner law
4. Lands that were handed over by the Jordanians that had passed to them from the British Mandate

The Israeli Land Department is the official managing organization. It has a consultancy relationship with the government and has full authority to decide land policy based on a 1960 law. An international administrator should consider the history of any area of land designated as state property; where the land originally came from may impact the administration of it.

Private Ownership
It is very difficult to prove private ownership of property. This, in part, stems from the fact that much of the private holdings are inherited without documentation. Other property may be divided in sections with various participating parties, and some property is divided as shares. Clearly, though, the major problem when dealing with private ownership is documentation. One of the most sensitive matters related to this is the effort by Israelis to purchase property in Palestinian areas. Documentation disputes often ensure.

Preserving the Right to Administer the City
Currently, the political or civil participatory role of Old City residents is very limited and in some domains even prohibited. They have little role in creating or administering public spaces even though they are the primary stake-holders. So-called Local Central Authorities are in charge of this. They are appendages of the Jerusalem Municipality and therefore follow the same agenda as the Israeli government. Moreover, Palestinians—who make up the clear majority of the Old City’s residents—are not Israeli citizens and do not participate in Israeli elections, fearing that their participation would be read as legitimizing the occupation. Thus, Palestinian Jerusalemites live in a place that they belong to nationally, spiritually, religiously, socially and culturally, and yet where they cannot practice their rights in ownership, free movement on the customary benefits of citizenship—nor can they exercise their duty in the production of their public space. Currently, their resources and strength to affect decision-making, fund allocations and the appointment of the bureaucracy are quite limited.

An international authority would be responsible for legal, human and urban rights in the Old City. It should also facilitate, through formal and informal organization, the participation of the residents in all details of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

Re-planning the Old City
Planning
The Urban Planning Reference of the Old City has been done by the Israeli authorities since the beginning of the 1970s. According to Bardaghme, Israeli policies do not benefit the mission of the Old City or its residents, and do little to preserve the character, history and culture of the community—nor do they protect and enhance it as a religious and economic center.

There are some efforts to re-plan the Old City, such as those of the Welfare Association in 2002. UNESCO has also examined the Old City in an effort to preserve the Israeli and Palestinian heritages of the area and has produced guidelines which we think an international administration should follow. They are responsive to the needs and rights of the citizens.

Currently, 29.5% of the residential buildings in the Old City need rehabilitation and 11.4%
of the residents require spatial expansion. Only 18.1% of the residences are suitable for living. In other words, over 80% of the residences require major rehabilitation, urgent maintenance or total revitalization. Unfortunately, the same general state of disrepair exists among public and religious buildings.

A new international administration cannot fulfill its role in managing space, buildings and functionality in the Old City if it relies on the planning, plan instructions and past cases of an occupying power that is alien to most of the residents. A change in administration provides an opportunity to regulate property matters by operating with motives that are not those of an occupying power. It is also an opportunity to try new tools and alternative plans. We think the goal should be to generate a development plan for the Old City that is based on moral and international standards conducive to the effective delivery of services and a dignified life for the people.

Re-creation of the Old City’s Identity
During the years Israel has maintained control over East Jerusalem, the identity of the Old City and its space has been transformed—essentially Judaized. Site names, street names and records have been changed; Israeli spaces and facilities have been created with considerable visual impact. To the extent possible, an international administration should examine these changes to the history and image of the Old City, while at the same time attempt to rectify them so that the historical image (and truth) is re-established. It should express the reality that a variety of civilizations have contributed to its identity.

Social and Public Services and the Provision of Infrastructure
The Old City has many social and public services, and some of the latter are controlled by governmental bodies. The question arises: will the public services be separated from their existing administrations if the Old City comes under the control of an international administration? It is important to know how these services will be administered in that case. Some of the services are presently under separate control; will they be united with the governmental services? We would propose an Office of Coordination that organizes the relations between public services to prevent duplication and waste. Map 5a and 5b locates the major social services in the Old City.

The needs of the Old City’s infrastructure are provided and maintained by public and non-governmental sources. Much of the infrastructure needs to be rehabilitated. In the following, we will discuss the condition of the respective elements of the infrastructure. Additional infrastructure data are available in the Appendix One.

The Road Network
Most of the 62 dunums of road network in the Old City is for pedestrians. The municipality is generally responsible for maintenance, sanitation and restoration of roads that have vehicular traffic. Currently, the Jerusalem Municipality is responsible for the maintenance, cleaning and rehabilitation of the network when it is used by the public or by the transportation system. Paths, alley ways and courtyards (hoshs) are the responsibility of owners. That fact, plus the poor economy, has led to a deterioration of this part of the system. There are some parking lots in the Old City, but they are inadequate and do not meet the needs of pilgrimage and tourists. These are controlled by private institutions; therefore there is a need to update the classification of the system. A special administrative department should be established to oversee the maintenance and rehabilitation of the entire system to improve mobility and create additional parking. Maps 6a and 6b display pedestrian and vehicular traffic patterns and popular tourist and commercial routes.

The Electric Network
Two companies provide electricity service to the Old City. JDECO is a private Palestinian firm that serves the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian Quarters and has 6,055 registered customers. The JDECO facilities and service is badly in
Map 5a: Community Services Location in the Old City
Map 5b: Social Centers, Association and the Families Courts used by Palestinians
Map 6a: Main Routes in the Old City
Map 6b: Main Tourist’s Routes and Attractions in the Old City
need of upgrading and increasing the number of transformers. IEC, an Israeli company, provides power to the Jewish Quarter. The municipality plays no role in the delivery of service other than coordination. An international regime may want to address the questions of whether the current system should continue or whether a local administrative authority should be established to provide and maintain the service. It must also be said that the public lighting system does not fit the status of a major international historic landmark. Map 7 displays the route of the main service lines; route information on the Jewish Quarter was unavailable.

**Water Network**
The Municipality provides the Old City with water and collects fees based on consumption. The condition of the system is quite bad, which leads to water losses that the consumers must pay for and, moreover, the leakage damages the underlying layers of the Old City. Here, too, we think there is a question of whether the maintenance and provision of water, and the future needs of the community, would be better served by a local administration.

**The Sewage System**
The sewage system of the Old City is connected with the system outside the walls. Currently there is no municipal administrative unit that is dedicated to the Old City network, and it is badly in need of rehabilitation because of many years of neglect.

**The Rainwater Drainage System**
There is a gutter and drainage system in parts of the Old City, but it does not cover all neighborhoods. The network needs to be extended to all areas of the Old City, and the existing lines are also in need rehabilitation. The international authority will be expected to address the water that collects outside and adjacent to the walls. The run-off of this water impacts the surrounding neighborhoods, especially the homes which are located on the sides of the valleys that surround the Old City. During the winter, there are 40 days of rainfall on average, and during the year there is over 600mm of rain.

**Communications Systems**
The Israeli firm Bezeq provides the Old City with telephone, television and internet services. We believe that a dedicated international organization unit should be created to coordinate these functions and to oversee the administrative, service and financial aspects of the systems.

**Street Sanitation**
The Municipality is responsible for street cleaning and trash removal. It is widely recognized that the municipality does a very poor job—especially in the Muslim Quarter. The current level of street sanitation leads to an unsafe and unhealthy environment, as well as spatial deterioration. It is not merely below the standards of a historic landmark; the conditions are below the standards of any civilized society. The municipality has shown almost utter disregard for the sanitation in East Jerusalem, but most especially in the Old City. An international administration should take clear responsibility for this function and may wish to examine the possibility of privatizing the function. Improving this function of the Old City would have a direct, positive impact on the standard of living.

It should be recognized that the narrow streets and passageways, as well as the limited vehicle roadway make the job of trash collection and disposal difficult. This may require the development of specialized equipment. Ongoing renovations and rehabilitation projects require special dumpster sites for the stone, soil, and construction trash involved.

**The Economy of the Administration**
Any new international authority will have to take into account its financial and budgetary needs. There are expenses involved in administrating, maintaining, and developing the Old City which include the renewal of its infrastructure and providing public services.

The income of the municipality in 2003 was 14
Map 7: Palestinian Electricity main cable in the Old City
million NIS (approximately USD 3.7 million), based on taxes on residences (5,748 units) and commercial operations (2,427 units). While this income could go to the new authority, it is clearly not enough for maintenance, rebuilding the infrastructure or providing necessary services to the population. It is estimated that a tax of 36 million NIS (USD 9.7 million) is required. Unfortunately, about half of the property in the Old City area is owned by religious or public institutions from which taxes are not collected. In fact, to the contrary, they will require financial support from the authority for certain maintenance and improvements.

While it is presumed that the international authority will have to generate an income for much of its expenses, or collect funds from external donor sources, we recommend an international fund be created to rebuild the infrastructure, improve the delivery of public services and to contribute to the trust-building between the authority and the citizens.

**Between Residency and Citizenship**

Currently, almost all of the Arab denizens of the Old City are identified as permanent residents, not as citizens. This classification falls short of endowing Palestinians with the rights that should be inherent in Palestinian citizenship. An international regime should provide for the implementation and protection of those rights. This goes beyond the right to vote; it includes the right to participate in the creation of public space. Thus, while citizenship is a political issue, it is also intrinsic to managing the Old City’s functionality.

**Social Welfare in the Old City**

Residents of the Old City, as in other areas of East Jerusalem, are entitled to many social benefits provided by the Israeli government, collectively known as the National Insurance Program. The Palestinian Jerusalemites pay into that system. The National Insurance Program, however, has no office within the Old City. Currently there are 19 organizations that provide social welfare programs to residents of the Old City. Eleven of these are civil societies, three are municipal institutions, four are international organizations (including UNRWA), and the Islamic Waqf. While the municipal offices of agencies are located in the Jewish Quarter, Palestinians do not access them because of language barriers. Instead, they go to offices outside the Old City where Arabic is spoken.

In our estimation, the levels of poverty, unemployment and low standards of living in the Old City require the development of a new concept of social welfare services. The present system does not contribute to the stability of the community or to the empowerment of its residents—which could end the cycle of poverty that has continued for decades. This is not an easy task, but it is essential to the development of the Old City.

**Security in the Old City**

The provision of security and safety for the residents of the Old City and its visitors is the first responsibility of any governing authority. The people’s sense of safety and security is directly related to a feeling of belonging to the space. Unfortunately, there is a tension between the Palestinian inhabitants and the Israeli authorities, and the authorities have responded by installing a network of cameras that monitors the movements of inhabitants. From the viewpoint of the authorities, the network represents a key part of the security system. While from the viewpoint of the residents, the network represents control; and the cameras are seen as posing an imposition on their freedom of movement and their right to privacy. In addition to the camera network, there are six police stations; four of which are in the Muslim Quarter and there is one each in the Jewish and Armenian Quarters. There are permanent and temporary checkpoints spread through the Old City-- especially at the main gates, at the entrance to the Jewish Quarter and in the area
of Al-Haram Al-Sharif.

Map 5a indicates the locations of Old City police stations and other points of police presence. Map 8 illustrates the areas of friction.

Conclusion

In sum, any administration, including an international regime, would face a broad array of challenges in overseeing the Old City. Even if one assumes optimal cooperation between the contending parties, the administration would confront substantial social, political, economic, and security challenges that could only be addressed effectively if a host of context issues are fully understood. These would include, at a minimum, comprehending the roles that spatial, historical, demographic, religious, environmental, and infrastructure factors play in the Old City, as well as an appreciation of the relationship of the ancient community to its immediate and hinterland surroundings.
Figure 1.6: An Israeli soldier overlooks the Damascus Gate in the Muslim Quarter.
Chapter Two

The Assassination of Place
Resisting Creeping Urbanization and Gentrification in the Old City of Jerusalem and its Surroundings
The Assassination of Place Resisting Creeping Urbanization and Gentrification in the Old City of Jerusalem and its Surroundings

In this chapter we discuss the Israeli control of the Old City of Jerusalem through the planning of renovation and revivification projects. We also discuss the impact of these tools on the transformation of urban space within the Old City. In brief, it is the view of this study that, in spite of the attempts of Israeli institutions to utterly Judaize and gentrify the space, the Arab presence is still alive and actually dominates the nature of the Old City. This fact notwithstanding, the Israeli planning and control agencies ignore organized Palestinian civic organizations and deny them the opportunity to actively participate in the development of the Old City.

We also explore this claim by examining it from three perspectives: first, within a theoretical conceptual framework growing out of the literature related to the processes of rehabilitation, construction and production in communities where there is an on-going conflict, particularly in the old parts of such cities; secondly, we review the recent history of efforts to revitalize in Jerusalem and the Old City, including the underlying forces at work, the characteristics of the many efforts, and the effects of the various plans and projects; thirdly, we identify the major tools that the Israeli authorities use to dominate, infiltrate, gentrify, and eliminate the Palestinian inhabitants within the Old City walls and beyond, and we note the consequences of these policies on Palestinian society. We conclude by formulating strategies to resist the unilateral, discriminatory planning and management polices that are re-shaping the reality of the Old City of Jerusalem and its surroundings. The strategies include both counter actions to Israeli schemes and the proactive involvement of the Palestinian people in developing their own plans, as well as the engagement of third party international oversight.

Deterioration and Urban Rehabilitation--a Conceptual Framework

The phenomena of deterioration and urban revitalization are common to most religious centers and ancient neighborhoods in cities throughout the world. Each urban unit, including the city centers, passes through an urban life cycle—first it will grow, and then gradually begin degrading physically, economically and socially. This deterioration leads to negative immigration (emigration) as the area becomes a less and less desirable site for housing and employment. We can clearly see the phenomenon of deterioration in most cities globally, especially in the second half of the twentieth century when the world began an “urban flight” to meet the rapidly growing demands for housing and employment.

The phenomenon of urbanization and deterioration has accelerated as result of the increase in the population of cities, the evolution of construction techniques and the economic growth resulting from globalization. The emergence of urbanized globalization, characterized by the creation of communication networks between the world’s major urban centers, has further solidified the role of cities as national and global hubs.

The deterioration of city centers leads to an emigration, especially of middle class residents. As city centers slowly become epicenters of the poor and in some cases nests of social pathologies and criminality, they become less attractive as sites for residence and commerce. These problems are exacerbated within cities that suffer from social fissures or cultural and national conflicts.

After such a period of deterioration, there is typically a vote or popular expression of opinion supporting the need for revival of the areas and the restoration of their functional role in the urban fabric (Neal, 2003). Having already lost much of the community’s original diversity, capital and economic activities, “revitalization” becomes the next logical step.

“Urban Vitality”, the concept that describes the
necessity to revitalize urban centers, outlines a process in which the mobility of life and economic, social and cultural activity are brought back to the degraded part of the city. Urban vitality is diminished when the city becomes unattractive to business and loses the economic capacity that originally distinguished it in a functional way. The decline in urban vitality is part of both a local phenomenon, within a consolidated political and economic environment, and a global process (Shatern and Na’ly Yusuf, 2009).

The restoration of urban vitality comes through a process known as “Urban Revitalization”. One of the premises of urban revitalization argues that it fights deterioration by increasing economic activities that depend on development, settlement and private investment in operational units within the city (Zielenbach, 2000). More private investment leads to an increase in the value of property, and finally contributes to the overall increase in the economic success of the area.

Urban revitalization is a comprehensive and multifaceted process that aims to solve urban problems through long-term solutions (Roberts, 2000). Some aspects focus on economic and structural features, while others concentrate on the comprehensive social sphere. The latter includes the production of methods, such as “Forest Life” or ‘Project Planning’, by which a differentiation is made about how a project is measured as successful (Gratz and Mintz, 1998). In short, the process is vital, and there is a clear difference between revival and renovation—the former includes the community, while the latter does not. Urban renovation, as a project, involves the demolition or “uprooting” of poor areas and their re-planting into new places or projects. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the renovation developments are part of the process of gentrification. Gentrification does not take into account the needs of the community. Instead, the process seeks to displace the original, indigenous inhabitants as a whole. The more organic urban revival or revitalization approach of intervention, known as “Forest Life”, takes into account the environmental ecosystem. It focuses on the integration, coherence and harmony of each component of the space. And, importantly, in this approach, the goals are development and progress based around what already exists in the space. In other words, it does not uproot, as in the renovation methodology. The revival approach is perhaps best described by Gratz and Mintz in their work, Urban Husbandry.

Studies concerned with the underlying objectives of the processes of urban revitalization and renovation in other cities have identified a desire to raise the values of properties based upon a predictable schedule of deterioration, revitalization and increased demand for urban spaces. The application of the gentrification process in the old neighborhoods of most European and American cities has led to a rise in the value and demand for property. However, this process begins only after those neighborhoods have been degraded socially, economically and physically (Smith, 1995). In order to increase the demand for these sites within the city, cultural events are developed and centered there, and an increased accessibility to different sites is developed (Elizabeth, 1999; Gross and Rogowsky, 1998).

After the application of the original renovation methodologies came under criticism, new methodologies were developed to achieve urban revitalization (Grogan and Proscio, 2000). The new methodology insists that the old neighborhoods can be healthy and attractive without imitating the suburban, economically or socially. In short, the goal is to regenerate a community, rather than to attract outsiders through a process of deterioration and the elimination of its diversity. These new methodologies can be summarized as “New Urbanism” – a movement developed in the cities of North America as a reaction to the process of suburbanization and the flight of people from the city centers to the suburbs.

The main ideas of this approach are:
• The strengthening of the relationship between the neighborhoods in the city centers
• The development of short foot paths and public spaces (e.g., for picnics or walks)
• The development of public transportation,
thereby reducing the number of private automobiles

- The development of integrated and harmonious land usage regulations in the city center

Another approach to urban revitalization is known as Urban Villages, first mentioned by Carbor Aosporgen in 1992. He theorized that in order to create an environment of accommodation throughout the city, one must first make improvements to the poor and abandoned areas within it (Neal, 2003). The objectives of the urban village approach are similar to the “new city” method. The application of this methodology requires the active involvement and presence of the inhabitants so that they can help formulate and produce the revitalized spaces in which they live (Soja, 2000; Lefebvre, 1991). Success, in the new approach, depends on the involvement of the inhabitants in the process of revitalization. There must be an agreement between the objectives of the inhabitants to improve their conditions and the urban governmental authorities that monitor resources, implement projects and regulate development.

**Urbanism and Renovation Programs in Jerusalem and the Old City**

As we have noted, the phenomenon of urbanism and renovation of urban centers is a global one. How has it operated in the case of the Old City? Before exploring that question, it should be noted that the phenomenon of the deterioration of neighborhoods in Jerusalem’s urban center was a nonorganic created process, particularly in the western part of the city after its division in 1948. The deterioration developed as a result of the suburbanization of the city and the establishment of neighborhoods and settlements around it based on geo-political motives. These motives grew out of a competition for the city center (i.e., the triangle between the streets Judea, King George and Jaffa) and neighborhoods that were degraded physically and socially, such as Nhalwt and Rahabaya.

The Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem (MoJ) has formulated and applied the policies of restoration for these neighborhoods through the development of infrastructure and an active campaign to attract the middle-classes to inhabit them. The Old City of East Jerusalem, however, was not included in the projects or as part of the revitalization of city centers in West Jerusalem.

The reasons for the delayed intervention to revive the Old City are primarily geo-political. East Jerusalem is still an occupied territory, and there is no foreseeable international decision that will legitimate this occupation. Although Israel asserts that it united East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem in 1967, most of the revitalization projects have focused on the construction of new settlements around the city.

We should note, however, that there were two “development” projects that impacted the Old City. The first was the gentrification of Bab-Almagarbah and Almeedan neighborhoods in 1967. Israel seized the properties and houses of the Palestinians living there (in an area of approximately 122,000 sq.m.) and replaced the mostly Moroccan area with what is now known as the Jewish Quarter. The second project was the partial renovation of infrastructure in various parts of the Old City during the seventies. With those exceptions, penetration into the Old City for urban revitalization has been largely deferred. One should also note that efforts at Jerusalem’s gentrification have drawn a great deal of Palestinian and international opposition, and this has prompted Israel and the MoJ to defer the continuation of the discriminatory renovation process.

In 1982, Jordan took the initiative to put Jerusalem on the UNESCO list of protected World Heritage sites. However, this declaration did not correct the flawed process of revitalization in the Old City as it should have by creating a plan oriented toward and supported by the people and institutions involved. In turn, the urban pressure increased. The geo-political conflict in Jerusalem, its physical state of disrepair and the standard of living of its inhabitants deteriorated. The situation of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem was especially dire. They had not been given citizenship in Israel, despite the city’s “unification” in 1967, and were instead defined as “permanent residents”.
During the nineties, and especially after the Oslo Agreement of 1993, a Palestinian process of revitalization for the Old City of Jerusalem came into effect. However, this process was limited, resulting only in the preparation of a revitalization scheme (Toqan and Khamaisi, 2002). Geo-political events such as the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000 and a drastic increase in Israeli attacks inside the occupied Palestinian Territories ultimately led to the tightening of Israeli closure on Jerusalem and the building of the separation wall between Jerusalem and its environs.

The Old City’s revitalization process was limited to only a few projects involving the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Jerusalem and a few local national societies. Conversely, the physical, social and economic situation in the Old City of Jerusalem continued to decline, prompting international institutions, such as UNESCO, to prepare a bench-marked achievement program by which to maintain those sites of unique and universal quality. These programs have also been limited, but the need to revive ancient Jerusalem remains as urgent as ever.

Between 1987 and 2000, the presence of the Israelis was significantly reduced in ancient Jerusalem. However, beginning in 2000, this migration began to reverse itself. In was in that year that the Israelis began to openly consider the Old City to be part of West Jerusalem and therefore sought to establish their total control over it.

To achieve the Israeli-desired process of the revitalization of the Old City, the MoJ put forth, and in 1973 adopted, under a plan known as pm/9, a detailed structural outline of the areas within the boundaries of the wall. Under pm/9, construction within the Old City and its immediate environs has ground to a halt. Any construction bid must undergo a rigorous and expensive process of planning, and then must wade through a time-consuming bureaucracy if it ever hopes to be realized. Ironically, this scheme has slowed not only Palestinian construction in or around the area, but also the neighboring Israeli settlements.

In the beginning of the year 2000, the MoJ began to amend pm/9 with a new detailed scheme of the Old City. This scheme sought to establish strict municipal control over the revitalization process in the Old City, and included the addition of a number of housing units. Though this scheme is still not being implemented, the amendments offered to it do not aim to revitalize. Rather, they seek to establish further Israeli control over the city, while diminishing Arab influence and participation, through the process of land use classification and the construction permission process. This new scheme (titled 10276) seeks to overcome the shortcomings of older schemes and is a joint effort of the Government of Israel (operating through the MoJ) and private developers. Its declared goal is to “renew, preserve and protect” the Old City. This scheme did not include the areas surrounding the Old City, but rather concentrated on the area within the walls along three axes:

- Preserving daily living patterns and cultures
- Preserving the distinguishing features of the architecture
- Tourism and economic infrastructure development

As of this writing, the scheme has only accomplished a few projects, such as the conservation of the walls around the Old City and the collection of waste from their base. Furthermore, these projects have so far been carried out without the active involvement of the inhabitants in either their formulation or implementation. Consequently, Palestinians view the process and results as observers rather than stakeholders.

Any effort to renovate or revitalize the Old City must take into account the interrelationship between certain realities, including: the resistance of Palestinian residents to emigration; the burgeoning population growth and its impact on density and housing demands; and the role of religions in the life and space of the Old City. For example, note that identification with religious sites, such as Al-Haram Al-Sharif and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, as well as with the cultural,
archical and historical heritage of the Old City, inhibits residents from emigrating from the community in an exodus that frequently can be observed in other cities. Their immobility in turn disrupts the typical urban lifecycle. Indeed, the low rate of emigration from the deteriorated center and the high rate of natural growth have functioned to increase the number of inhabitants significantly. Since 1967, the population of the Old City has increased from 23,675 in 1967 to 37,060 by the end of 2006 (see Table 2.1).

This increase was abetted by the closure policies of 1993 and 2000, a key part of which was the so-called “Center of Life” provisions. Palestinians who held the blue card status to reside in Jerusalem and receive the Israeli social welfare package—but who had chosen to live outside the city—were threatened with the loss of those benefits if they did not in fact reside within the city itself. Consequently, many chose to return to East Jerusalem and of those, many resettled in the Old City, adding to its population and worsening urban density. The onset of the separation wall in 2002 gave further impetus to this return migration.

In short, the city’s population did not naturally decrease, or unload—a fact which makes renovation a more complicated process. What little population unloading that has occurred, under the guise of renovation, has been anything but natural. As we noted earlier, as part of the gentrification process the neighborhoods of Almagarbah and Almeedan were completely demolished and their space was “renovated” into a Jewish neighborhood.

- Table 2.1 shows that the population of the Old City has increased by 56.5% in the last 40 years. In comparison, the population of Jerusalem as a whole has increased around 175% over the same period.
- Table 2.1 shows that there is difference in growth rates in the Old City according to the religious affiliation. While Muslims have increased their numbers by about 65%, the Armenians have decreased nearly by half between 1967 and 2006.
- The rapid population growth explains the Old City’s high housing unit density, as illustrated in Table 2.2 below.
- The calculation of the data is according to generally recognized neighborhood borders.
- This table does not include the Al-Haram Al-Sharif, which, including the surrounding walls, occupies, 137,000 sq.m,

Usually ancient cities deteriorate as a result of urban flight or significant decreases in population, however the Old City suffers from the opposite problem—an increase in the population and accommodation density within its defining walls. Moreover, there are large discrepancies between the neighborhoods in the Old City in terms of population density. Net density in the Jewish neighborhood is about one third of that in the Islamic neighborhood even though the combined area of the Jewish and Armenian neighborhood is three times the size of the Muslim Quarter. This rapid density increase within one sector, which comprises only 40% of the physical space, has significant consequences on the lifestyles and standards of the inhabitants. The strain extends from accommodation standards to the quality of sewage and drain water infrastructure, as well as on other public services.

As a natural consequence of the steady increase of inhabitants in ancient Jerusalem, the competition for accommodation has grown. The following Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 show the changes in the housing sector inside the Old City over a recent five year period (2003 – 2007).

### Table 2.1: Population in the Old City 1967-2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>16,681</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22,814</td>
<td>5,377</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>32,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>5,681</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>37,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate 1967-2006</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-50.6</td>
<td>10.2 (based on 1995)</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2: Population Density and Construction in the Old City (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants*</th>
<th>The land area of housing (per 1000sq.m)</th>
<th>The land area of institutions (per 1000sq.m)</th>
<th>Number of housing units</th>
<th>The space of buildings for housing</th>
<th>Net density of inhabitants for housing</th>
<th>Density of building housing units per 1000sq.m</th>
<th>Built space per person m²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>5,419</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>50,774</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>32,707</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>41,117</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>26,646</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>34.2 **</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>139,169</td>
<td>173.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Old City</td>
<td>37,075</td>
<td>285.3</td>
<td>176.6</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>263,767</td>
<td>129.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Housing Units in the Old City (2003 – 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1216</td>
<td>1217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>3394</td>
<td>3406</td>
<td>3402</td>
<td>3401</td>
<td>3410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City total</td>
<td>5763</td>
<td>5786</td>
<td>5802</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>5814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem total</td>
<td>177142</td>
<td>180347</td>
<td>182665</td>
<td>184655</td>
<td>187469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City as a % of Jerusalem</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.4: Average Housing Space in the Old City as Compared with Jerusalem as a Whole (2003 – 2007 sq. m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City as a % of Jerusalem</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.5: Square Meters of Housing Space in the Old City (2003–2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>49,880</td>
<td>49,945</td>
<td>50,224</td>
<td>50,249</td>
<td>50,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>32,373</td>
<td>32,340</td>
<td>32,688</td>
<td>32,695</td>
<td>32,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>39,721</td>
<td>40,243</td>
<td>40,822</td>
<td>41,053</td>
<td>41,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>137,770</td>
<td>138,267</td>
<td>138,531</td>
<td>138,934</td>
<td>139,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old City total</td>
<td>259,744</td>
<td>260,795</td>
<td>262,265</td>
<td>262,931</td>
<td>263,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem total</td>
<td>13,461,454</td>
<td>13,726,604</td>
<td>13,967,242</td>
<td>14,167,709</td>
<td>14457,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tables show that from 2003-2007, a mere 47 housing units were added in the Old City while 10,327 housing units have been established in Jerusalem as a whole--most of them in the predominantly Jewish Western side of the city. The area of housing units in the Old City in 2007 was equivalent to approximately 36% of that occupied by housing units in Jerusalem as a whole. To highlight the contradiction between population growth and construction note that between the years 2003 and 2007, the constructed area in the Old City merely increased by 4,023 sq. meters!

Despite the allegation of illegal construction in the Old City, the records of the MoJ indicate that the volume of construction has not responded to the increased needs of the inhabitants. It is true that the Old City suffers from a pattern of emigration, mostly among its upper class, but high birth rates—especially amongst the Muslim population and the forced return of blue carders from the suburbs--have led to a net increase in the Old City’s population, all within a highly defined finite space (see Table 2.6).

Most Palestinian Jerusalemites are still in the process of urbanization. This is indicated in their consistently high birth rates and low average age. Data gathered in 2005 revealed that the average age in Jerusalem in 2005 was 23.4 years. The average age of Palestinian Christians was 34.1 years, for Muslims it was 19.1 years and for Israelis the average age was 25. Within the Old City, the average age of Muslims was 18.4; which is lower than both the Jewish and Christian populations in the Old City which were found to be 19.1 and 31.6 years respectively (Israeli Statistical Yearbook, 2007; Table C/14: 104 - 105).

After reviewing the increase in population and its impact on the revitalization of the Old City, it must be noted that the urban configuration of Jerusalem does not align with standard metropolitan life cycles of renovation or revitalization; i.e. urbanization, sub-urbanization, distribution and the return to the city center under the programs of renovation or revitalization. Though this standard model fits the urbanized, metropolitan Israeli behavior, it does not apply to the Palestinians, who are villagers still in the process of urbanization and do not act to renovate or revitalize their city center. It should be remembered that a significant part of the population originally came from the Hebron area, such as the large Edkidk and Hijazi families, and they still exercise traditional demographic behaviors in the Old City. To be sure, between 1949 and 1967, the Old City was also inhabited by wealthy upper-middle class and elite families but many of these later emigrated. Now, most of the population of the Old City belongs to the middle and poorer classes.

Furthermore, the decrease in housing opportunities and the threat of confiscation of Jerusalem I.D. residency permits from any who might move outside the city have prevented the displacement of the inhabitants from inside the Old City, outward. Beyond the political aspect, many of the Palestinians living in the Old City have remained there because of its proximity to the Haram Al-Sharif and the promise of religious rewards for attending to and protecting the site. This faith-based motivation has long played a role in affecting both immigration and emigration rates in the Old City.

Another reason for the Palestinian steadfastness in remaining in the Old City is the provocation of extreme-right Jewish organizations and Israeli individuals attempting to move into the Old City, either by purchasing or confiscating Palestinian homes. Ironically, this behavior has helped to create an atmosphere that leads Palestinians to steadfastly remain in the Old City. Despite the creeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The area</th>
<th>Inhabitants Beginning-2005</th>
<th>Inhabitants End-2005</th>
<th>Balance of Immigration</th>
<th>% Population Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old City</td>
<td>35894</td>
<td>36577</td>
<td>-387</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>31949</td>
<td>32635</td>
<td>-306</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>3945</td>
<td>3942</td>
<td>-81</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 The author posits that this demographic behavior, amongst Palestinians in the Old City, is due to their not having adapted to the ‘urban’ model and continued reliance upon the ‘village’.
settlement growth within\(^2\) and around the Old City, resulting from previous forced gentrification projects, Palestinians in the main have chosen not to leave.

The increased demand for accommodation in the Old City is caused by the strict control over Palestinian construction outside of the walls in the surrounding area. Since its adoption, scheme ASG/9 has imposed strict regulations that prevent the extension of the buildings outside the walls of the Old City which would provide solutions to the inhabitants within. The Old City provides educational, religious and cultural services for Jerusalemites from surrounding neighborhoods such as Wadi Al-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah and Salah Al-Din. Ironically, the prevention of Palestinian-oriented development outside the walls and in the surroundings of the Old City has actually contributed to the impossibility of Palestinians abandoning the Old City.

*****

The concentration of religious and cultural centers in the Old City has been beneficial to the revitalization of the area and its centrality. Table 2.7 shows the distribution of institutions and cultural centers in the Old City.

Historically, this density of religious institutions was one of the driving forces behind the revitalization of the Old City. The desire of each particular sect to maintain and use these sites for instruction, service provision, donation gathering and inter-faith competition prompted religious institutions to take better care of their spatial allotment in Jerusalem. There is perhaps no city in the world that contains this number of religious institutions in such a small space. The land under the control of these institutions has reached 312,000 sq.m, or 36% of the entire Old City. Each institution manages the physical condition and supervises the administration of these sites.

While most home-owners attempt to do the maintenance and restoration of their homes on their own, these attempts are conditional upon the wealth of the resident. Because most of the Palestinian Jerusalemite families in the Old City have relatively low incomes, their ability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of institutions</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working educational institutions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museums and libraries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sites of religious and historical importance</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and service buildings</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox sites and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic sites and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian- Orthodox sites and organizations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battist Sites and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coptic- Orthodox sites and organizations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sites and other institutions and shared</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapel</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural sites and museums</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 336</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Fewer than 12 sites were colonized beyond the neighborhood known as the Jewish Quarter in 1967. Since then, Jewish groups monitoring the Old City point out that the number has grown to over forty. (Mier, 2007) - see Chapter Three and Appendix Two.
to preserve or restore their residence is limited. Many of these families have added to their accommodation using materials and “informal” building techniques that do not fit within the mosaic of the Old City. Consequently, they actually work to distort the aesthetics and privacy of the space.

Moreover, the absence of a municipal authority to maintain the public space in the Old City has contributed to the deterioration of the public and semi-public spaces in the vicinity: about one fifth of the space of the Old City is “general” space and is lacking any municipal or local authority through which to manage or reverse its deterioration. The distribution of responsibilities and powers within the Old City has led to the absence of any centralized authority to oversee the process of revitalization. The dispersed initiatives carried out by individuals and the institutions of Palestinian civil society have not led to any significant change. Rather, conditions have continued to deteriorate in spite of a growing population.

Activities undertaken by the national institutions have, thus far, not changed the realities in the Old City. Recently, interest in the revitalization of the Old City has increased, especially because of growing recognition about the danger that informal construction was posing to inhabitants. This increased awareness, however, still operates under Israeli control. Consequently, it does not produce qualitative transformation “on the ground”.

The lack of any real political agreement, or even gestures towards one, has created an opportunity for the MoJ to initiate plans for the revitalization of the Old City. This plan is still in its infancy, and eight Israeli institutions—both formal and informal—currently oversee this process of revitalization. They are the Antiquities Authority, the Development Company of Jerusalem, the Israel Lands Authority, the State Tourism Corporation, the Corporation for the Restoration and the Development of the Jewish Quarter, the Company for the Development of East Jerusalem, the Department of Nature and National Gardens, and the Jerusalem Fund.

In addition to these, there are Palestinian institutions such as the General Jerusalem Assembly, cooperative societies, church organizations and UNESCO. They are working in parallel with the Israeli institutions. While most are not recognized, and even fewer are empowered in any formal sense, they play a vital part in the revitalization process by monitoring international laws and norms.

Contemporary Israeli plans for revitalizing the Old City are built upon the following underlying forces and motives:

1. The failure of political negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, especially after Camp David, convinced Israel to consolidate its control over Jerusalem. While Israel controls the Old City, its continual deterioration is not attractive to tourists, visitors or pilgrims—which casts doubt not only on Israel’s right, but also their capacity, to maintain the Old City and its surroundings.

2. The Israeli government and the MoJ have, in large part, abdicated the real authority of their roles. Instead, they have allowed the vigilantism of right-wing extremist groups to play a major part in transforming the Old City (see Chapter Three). On the other hand, Palestinian institutions have also entered into the provision of services in the Old City, and are now posing alternative structures that differ from those provided by the Israeli government. The absence of Israeli authority in the Old City stems from fear of international pressure over the legality of its assertion. However, because of recent geo-political changes, local and global, the atmosphere has become opportune for the Israeli government to intervene in the Old City once more.

3. The separation wall between Jerusalem

---

3. Of the 872,000 sq.m. of space within the walls, public and open squares occupy 186,000 sq.m. (21%).
and the Palestinian territories prevents Palestinian suburban communication with the Old City. This wall sent a message to the world, and to the Palestinians, that the reality on the ground, not laws, would determine the control of Jerusalem.

4- Interference from UNESCO came in the form of reports detailing the conditions of the deteriorating Old City, both as a site of universal heritage and as an occupied territory. In the case of the former, even in times of conflict, cultural heritage is the responsibility of the dominant or occupying force.

5- The Old City of Jerusalem constitutes one of the major tourist centers in the country. In order to attract tourists and pilgrims, the Old City must provide an infrastructure that is able to accommodate increasing numbers of visitors, especially in the public areas.

6- The absence of certified control over the processes of planning in the Old City is apparent and costly. As the population increases, there are home additions made by residents to provide a minimal level of accommodation. Because the residents have built without first receiving the required permits and permission, the MoJ is able to reject any subsequent petitions with no oversight, and little recourse for appeal.

7- The preparation of a comprehensive structural outline for Jerusalem, “Jerusalem 2000”, put the Old City in the heart of the plan. Despite this effort, the municipal governmental authorities have continued to ignore what is actually happening in the Old City and its surroundings.

8- After the Israeli authorities created a belt of settlements around Jerusalem and tightened control through the construction of the wall, they have returned their attention to the Old City. The settlement belt surrounding the Old City area passes through Silwan, Dahod, Wadi Al-Joz and onwards to Sheikh Jarrah.

9- The increase in the population of the Old City, and the resulting “illegal” construction, was unacceptable to Israeli authorities seeking to revitalize the city center in a tourist-oriented fashion. Prepared schemes and plans dictate construction in the Old City, not the needs of the inhabitants.

10- There is a necessity to provide basic services to the residents of Jerusalem, the taxpayers. If these services are not provided, it threatens the health of the Old City residents and of those residents who live in the surrounding Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods.

These forces are the underlying factors behind the initiatives of the municipality in the Old City. Although parts of these policies appear to include the interests of the population in their content and application, in reality they do not.

A legitimate, institutionalized vacuum of power in the Old City has led to the continuous, random construction and development. The effort to guide this process exerted by Palestinian civil institutions has been limited due to a lack of resources and political or legal representation. Because Jerusalem is under Israeli sovereignty, an authority rejected by most of the international community, they have created a reality that is inherently full of contradictions. The Israeli authorities seek to legitimize the union of Jerusalem and to control the Old City. At the same time, the Palestinian inhabitants and the civil institutions have refused to deal with the Israeli authorities or to coordinate with them on the restoration, rehabilitation and revitalization of the Old City.

After occupying East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel extended its sovereignty over the area. However, this sovereignty did not include the Palestinian inhabitants, who instead remain permanent residents without citizenship rights. The inherent elitism of the process of extending sovereignty and “screening inhabitants” extends from an ideology that seeks to “clean up the space” (spacio-cide)
while keeping the population more or less intact (Hanafi, 2009). Spacio-cide not only includes the destruction of buildings, but also the attempt to change the identity of a place—as if to brainwash the public into believing that there is a correlation between a place and its new identity.

The assault on the Islamic character of the Old City has not been limited to physical destruction, but has also focused on changing the character and identity of the place: practices such as renaming areas, corroborating non-governmental institutions, and the manipulation of movement have all entered into the policy toolkit.

After the establishment of the Jewish neighborhood on the ruins of Almagarbah, the project of changing the names, nature and development of infrastructure in the Old City was launched. Ironically, these projects have been completed in a reality in which the number of Palestinians who live within the Old City is increasing, rather than decreasing. Thus, there is a contradiction between the real presence of Palestinians in the Old City and the Israeli desire to transform it through a constant and creeping control.

The Palestinians in the Old City have challenged Israeli control by establishing and expanding their homes without a license. As the municipality will not give new building licenses due to the imposed freeze on construction in the Old City, the demand for housing and resettlement among residents, both Israeli and Palestinian, has grown.

The Palestinian side has a historic presence and a clear present claim to the place because they constitute the majority of the population. However, they do not have any legal authority or political power. Therefore, they struggle to survive under a policy that seeks to control and reduce their numbers through such means as the confiscation of I.D.’s, the implementation of fines, raising fees and house demolitions.

Despite their suffering and inability to change the rules of the game, the Palestinians continue to resist these practices. Still, the Israeli side has the resources and wields the power to extend its influence over the Old City. This influence is comprehensive and includes the closure of areas, the initiation of projects to serve only Israelis, as well the preparation of an alternative historical knowledge base and narrative to offer visitors and tourists.

The renovation and revival of the Old City was initiated by the Israeli authorities on the premise that the current sovereign Israeli control would continue for the foreseeable future. The vision of Jerusalem as the capital and heart of the Jewish people must be realized not only through slogans, but a real Israeli presence—especially in the area in and around the Old City. This does not mean ignoring the Palestinian presence, but rather “dealing with it” through population displacement or its gradual transformation from majority to minority.

The Old City, as the historic heart of Jerusalem, is inhabited by a wide variety of cultures, histories and classes that insist on a different approach to the process of renovation than that offered by the Israeli authorities. These authorities exercise power over ancient ruins, and over time the entire Old City of Jerusalem and its surroundings have been declared both an archaeological and world heritage site. This means that construction is prohibited without prior archaeological examination of the area. Moreover, right-wing Jewish institutions try to seduce or exploit the weaknesses of property owners in title disputes that are often unfair. The results are typically land confiscations followed by the transfer of that land to Israeli control, such as that which is happening now in Silwan, Dahod and the area of Shimon Alsedeeq in the region of Kopanyah Om-Harum.

Resolving the hardships that the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict has brought upon the region, and the Old City in particular, depends on the urban revitalization method known as Forest Life. This method allows for the involvement and participation of the population living in urban space in the decision-making process over its development. However, Palestinians do not trust this engagement, and they fear that their participation in these projects could lend legitimacy to the occupation’s authority and its claim of sovereignty over the Old City. The fear
of granting legitimacy to Israeli projects pushes Palestinians to oppose them outright in defense of their own right to be there—even going so far as to appeal to the judicial institutions of Israel to interfere in the government’s planning institutions.

**Strategies for Renewing the Old City**

The on-going conflict requires a re-evaluation of the means and objectives of the revitalization of the Old City in order to include Palestinian interests in Jerusalem and to preserve its character and identity.

Our suggested scheme of renovation and revitalization focuses on three axes. The first is the Living City method, which means the development of the Old City as an urban fabric that will be used effectively for housing, work, trade and education with an emphasis on the empowerment of the inhabitants and community development. To achieve such complex goals, there must be participation from all sectors of the Old City’s population.

The second axis focuses on the “Conservation of Existing Heritage”. This includes the restoration and rehabilitation of buildings in the Old City, especially those of historical, cultural or religious significance, and the strengthening of public institutions. The goal is to maintain the fabric of the Old City, including the groups and classes that make it up. Each class represents a period of civilization and history of ancient Jerusalem. The accumulation of these classes and epochs makes distinguishing them and managing them difficult within the finite space of the Old City.

The third component relates to the development of tourism as the core element of economic development in the Old City. Tourists and pilgrims coming to the ancient city bring a great deal of money with them, and leave with memories and impressions. The desire to sculpt these perceptions, of the identity of the Old City in particular, is at the heart of many problems facing any future joint Israeli-Palestinian planning process.

There is little confidence between Israelis and Palestinians concerning any revitalization scheme; indeed, so little that UNESCO could only coordinate the preservation of the cultural heritage in the Old City by conducting separate meetings with the two feuding sides. The vital coordination, facilitated by UNESCO, takes place without any face-to-face communication between the primary stakeholders.

An outline plan for the Old City was launched by a Palestinian institution, the Welfare Association, that is reality-based and focused on achievable strategies by which to revive the area. However, the Israeli side has not adopted their strategies and, thus, little has been accomplished within Jerusalem and the Old City while under their dominion. Furthermore, there is a major contradiction between the hypotheses and structural basis of the Palestinian scheme versus Israeli objectives, though through professional mediation and facilitation, these may be overcome.

The MoJ is preparing another renovation project for the Old City, and again this project is considered by Palestinians to be yet another extension of Israeli control or provoked by gentrification as were previous projects. Because of this, though severely affected by the results, Palestinians often willingly remove themselves from the process. Also UNESCO has developed a plan to complete the restoration and rehabilitation of urban buildings and landmarks in the Old City.
City, but its achievements are still limited. In other words, the conflict over the Old City still constitutes a major impediment to revitalization. In the meantime, urban deterioration continues.

The question now becomes: “How do we get out of this impasse and rejuvenate a confined space where approximately 37,000 people, surrounded by a further 60,000, are living in substandard housing and subjected to inadequate services?” Does this current reality have to continue? Or are there methods by which to revive the Old City in a manner that nurtures the success of the larger geo-political agreement? Regardless of the big picture, there must be a restoration and rehabilitation of the urban fabric that will enable and empower the inhabitants to be involved with the development of their own environment.

Until a larger conflict resolution agreement is reached, Palestinians have two choices: continue fighting the policies practiced by the Israeli authorities, or they can slowly allow themselves and their identity to be wiped out of the Old City and its surroundings. Before either path is chosen, one should learn the lessons of history and develop realistic and assertive strategies focused on the empowerment of Palestinian Jerusalemites.

**New Rules: Active Palestinian Involvement—Resistance and Intervention**

This strategy should not follow an automatic reactionary response to the Israeli courts and its description of reality. Instead, this new initiative should create different rules of the game, ones that increase the Palestinian presence in the production and formulation of their space and environment, including the restoration, rehabilitation and revitalization process. The suggested initiative is derived from the concepts of both resistance and behavior. It should be pointed out that resistance allows for the utilization of patterns and methods by which Palestinians can protect ancient Jerusalem. The role of professionals in this new reality is especially important, as they must be charged with creating working bodies and mechanisms able to invest in the Old City’s available space as well as defend the identity of Jerusalem in joint Israeli-Palestinian forums.

The starting point is the recognition that the Old City of Jerusalem is not the property of Israel, and, therefore, the state’s efforts to gentrify it or to kill its identity are illegitimate. It is a city of universal value and a formalized part of the world’s heritage. It possesses an Arab and Islamic character, and in the face of Israeli practices, this must be protected.

It is not enough for Palestinians to merely monitor and record the transformations going on around them; they must go further and begin to actively interfere with the formulation of production and maintenance schemes in Jerusalem.

The resistance strategy of intervention is based on community-level organization and institution-building. These institutions will serve to represent the interest and identity of the Palestinian people in their dealings with Israeli authorities and will, in turn, rely upon the international laws and norms that require the occupier to defend certain rights and liberties of the occupied.

A process of defense and civilian resistance in the urban space, one that contributes to the empowerment of people through their conscious participation, needs to be developed. Rather than participation offering legitimacy to Israeli control, an active popular movement can at once make real policy achievements, while also strengthening the identity and attachment of Palestinians with the Old City and its surroundings. In parallel to the process of organizing the community, the process of planning strategies that encompass Palestinian interests at the planning and project level needs to be ongoing. Maintaining a Palestinian presence, and resisting the transformation of reality by Israel, must be carried out at both the community level and through the development of professional alternative plans.

**International Oversight**

A key part of the strategy is the enhancement of the role of UNESCO, to the position of acting supervisor over a process of revitalization and rehabilitation of the Old City that includes both Israelis and Palestinians. We must therefore
develop a comprehensive methodology for planning, as well as empowering an internationally recognized body able to represent the residents of the Old City and its basin. This will allow for the joint groups of Israelis and Palestinians to meet under supervision, as well as allowing the participation of Arab countries on the behalf of stateless Palestinians.

Inclusion of the Neighboring Environment
The scope of the strategy promoted here—resistance, intervention, and internationalization—is not limited to the Old City and its basin. The Israeli campaign to exclude neighboring Palestinian villages from Jerusalem has been crucially important to the weakening of the Old City—economically and culturally and has diminished its central place in Palestinian identity. The Old City’s linkages with Palestinian Jerusalem surroundings must be included in the revitalization efforts.

Conclusion
Despite Israeli policies aimed at gentrifying, evacuating and indeed assassinating a civilization and heritage, the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem continues to grow and resist. Their presence in the Old City is the basis for a process of revitalization and the restoration of urban vitality. The planning and methodology of revitalization projects should be inspired by their surroundings and makeup.

In order to not trample the ecosystem in our effort to revive and rehabilitate, the methodologies adopted should be based upon the principles of the Forest Life and Urban Village approaches. These methodologies allow us to address the unique character of Jerusalem and its Old City, a character too complex to be captured in ready-made “off the shelf” applications. Currently, the conflict over and within the Old City forms a clear obstacle to resolving the broader conflict. However, the absence of the broader solution has, in turn, burdened the development of Jerusalem and the restoration of its urban vitality. Lacking an overall solution limits Palestinian agency in the process. Will they allow the situation to continue? Or will they change the form and organize their resistance to ensure the preservation, restoration and continuity of their presence in Jerusalem?

There is no doubt that the ideas put forth in this analysis need to be developed further through the establishment of professional institutions based on private, collective and political support. These institutions need to deal with the “realities of now” in Jerusalem, and work to alleviate the suffering of their constituents while defending their identity and presence in the Old City.

The City of Jerusalem, the Holy City, has its own character and distinctiveness. It therefore requires tools, policies and strategies that understand and protect its uniqueness. The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is slowly assassinating the space of Jerusalem, despite the promises of humanitarian, religious and nationalist organizations to protect it.
Chapter Three

THE MATRIX OF ISRAELI CONTROL IN THE MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN QUARTERS OF THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM
CHAPTER THREE

The Matrix of Israeli Control in the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem

One of the most vexing problems in determining the future of Jerusalem is the matrix of control that Israel has laid over the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City. Since the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, successive Israeli governments have endeavoured unceasingly to alter the Arab character of the Old City by fostering a critical Jewish mass – territorial as well as demographic – aimed at creating a new reality dominated by Israel. That process, explicitly called “Judaization” by Israel, is aimed at assuming control of the Old City by “de-Arabizing” it at the expense of both its population and heritage.

The process of changing the physiognomy of the Old City has been gradual but steady. Specific elements appear unimportant, localized and even neutral, as if the product of a planning policy that benefits all Jerusalemites. Seen as a whole in both its physical and demographic aspects, however, this matrix reveals a conscious, systematic and sinister policy of de-Arabization.

Successive Israeli governments have employed two mutually reinforcing means to constantly expand and solidify the matrix. The official organs of the state – the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of the Interior, the court system, the police and others – work hand-in-hand with unofficial bodies, such as settler associations, who perform functions that the state is unable or unwilling to do, either due to the unseemliness or the out-and-out illegality of such acts. The settlers’ associations constitute the gendarme of the government, and in return they flourish through public subsidies, sponsorship and the cooperation of every legal government authority from the municipality to the police. A symbiotic relationship has formed between them to the extent that it is often unclear who is in charge – the state or the settlers themselves.

This chapter focuses on actions by Jewish settlers in the very heart of East Jerusalem’s Arab population centres – both public and those concealed by the Israeli government -- through an analysis of the properties taken over in the Old City. The settlers’ endeavours are shrouded in secrecy, but despite their track-covering efforts, we have collected enough material to assemble a reliable and comprehensive picture of their activities.

In the wake of the Oslo Accords and subsequent peace processes, the Jewish settlement project in East Jerusalem and particularly in the Old City, took on greater impetus and urgency, spurred by settlers’ fears that Jerusalem could be divided as part of a peace agreement. Israel’s government and the Jerusalem Municipality proceeded on the assumption that the international community would eventually enforce a diplomatic arrangement involving some sort of division. It is also assumed that when that time comes, the existing settlements would determine, to a large extent, the city’s boundaries, as in 1948. As a result, both the state and the municipality are expending tremendous efforts to create “facts on the ground” that rule out any future division of the city. The settlers’ strategy is clear: to create a situation in which future diplomatic agreements to divide Jerusalem will be impossible. The website of Ateret Cohanim states this openly: “Determination and collaboration with the authorities have proven to be the old method of Zionism – now it is Jewish settlement that determines the borders of the state!”

Photo: Police stand guard at the doorway of a settler’s house in the Muslim Quarter
The organization taking the lead in the process of Judaizing the Old City is Ateret Cohanim, headed by Mati Dan, a settler with extensive contacts in the Israeli government, including with the office of the Prime Minister. Ateret Cohanim works alone but is also part of a wider coalition known as the Jerusalem Forum. This coalition brings together those organizations working toward the Judaization of East Jerusalem, including the messianic groups hoping to build the Third Temple over the Haram al-Sharif. In the Muslim and Christian Quarters, the coalition controls 20 buildings in which 60 families (300 people) reside. Most of the buildings are grouped along El Wad Street, the most famous of which is the home of Ariel Sharon.

Recent major Old City “acquisitions” by Ateret Cohanim include St. John’s Hostel, a large building close to the Holy Sepulchre, and two prominent hotels near the Jaffa Gate - the Imperial and the Petra. The hotels were purchased through dubious methods and disreputable agents within the Greek Orthodox Church (legal proceedings over the hotels and hostel are ongoing). A residential complex is also planned near the Herod’s Gate, at Burj Al Laqlaq, deep within the Muslim Quarter, in an area renamed Ma’aleh Ha’Hasidot. This is a government initiative on behalf of the settlers of Ateret Cohanim and is a prime example of government-settler cooperation. Plans are also in the works for 33 buildings to be erected close to the Old City, along with a synagogue that will soar seven meters over the ancient walls.
In addition to the settlements, there are a number of religious academies and yeshivas that serve to stake out a Jewish presence in every Arab neighborhood in the Old City. The most notable are the yeshivas of Ateret Yerushalayim, Shuvu Banim, Aderet Eliyahu, Ateret Cohanim, Torat Haim, and Hazon Yehezkel. To be sure, there are some orthodox yeshivas that have no active interest in supporting the settlers’ enterprise; nevertheless they function as part of a large scheme. This is demonstrated by the fact that the settlers themselves include such institutions on their maps and brochures. Palestinians differentiate between the two groups: the settlers are known as mustawteneen, while the ultra-orthodox Ashkenazim are called busbusim.

Methods for Seizing Property

Arab properties in East Jerusalem are seized by settlers using three methods: claiming previous Jewish ownership and receiving a court order to remove the Palestinian residents; taking over so-called “absentee property”; and through dubious transactions, including the use of Palestinian collaborators. In the last method, settlers often exploit situations of vulnerability. For instance, when a family member is embroiled in a criminal case and the desperate family is willing to sell everything in order to hire a lawyer, pay fines, relocate or pay previous accumulated debt. When an Old City Muslim or Christian building is occupied by a new settler,
a collaborating single Palestinian man or family in economic straits (often not from the Old City) usually working for the settlers, first moves in. The collaborator continues living, often for free, in the building until the settlers decide the time is ripe to seize it for themselves. Settlers operate in this way to avoid highlighting the fact that Palestinians sold the house to Jews. After this, in many cases, the collaborator is simply moved to another seized property.

One of the main players in Old City real-estate transactions has been the Greek Orthodox Church. Although this distinctly sensitive issue has not been thoroughly clarified, it seems that the anarchy that resulted from internal disagreements at the Greek Patriarchate enabled church property to be sold off for personal gain, which appears to have been the case in the sale the St. John’s Hostel, the Imperial and Petra hotels and a string of shops in close proximity to the Jaffa Gate. The transactions were executed by a straw front company headquartered in the Virgin Islands, Richard’s Marketing Corporation, represented in Israel by attorney Yossef Richter. It should be noted that in his petition to the Supreme Court in November 2005, the new Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, Theophilos III, stated that the State of Israel was conditioning its recognition of his appointment on his authorization of those transactions. According to the Patriarch, the bureau of Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, and Minister Rafi Eitan are placing pressure on him.\(^1\)

It is not difficult for settler associations to lay their hands on Arab property. All they must do is find families in dire economic straits or criminal elements seeking easy money, then purchase property from them via a “straw” Arab middleman and wait for the right moment to seize the property openly. Financing is not a problem. There is unlimited support by American Jews willing to donate on condition that the recipients maintain a low profile and do not arouse the anger of non-Jews. Accordingly,

\(^{1}\) Meron Rapoport, “What is good for Ateret Cohanim is good for the State”, Haaretz, February 2, 2007.
they buy properties by unscrupulous methods and introduce collaborator-tenants, while refraining initially from registering the property in their own names until the politically appropriate time arrives.

**Settler Ideology**

The ideology that motivates the settlers in East Jerusalem is a combination of messianic and nationalistic ideas, and thus differs from settlers elsewhere in the West Bank. Their primary goal is to “redeem” the land in East Jerusalem and hand it back to the Jewish people. An Ateret Cohanim advertisement defines its goal as engaging in “Buying, renovating and introducing new Jewish tenants into houses and properties in and around the Old City, plot by plot, home by home, step by step, a little at a time”. Their endeavours are fuelled by religious commandments, and since a divine plan guides their work, they are positive that time is on their side and that “the Eternal One of Israel does not lie”. They therefore consider their work in East Jerusalem as a mission, a task that not only fulfils the nation’s goals, but Divine Will as well. Such a mission imbues their life with significance, pride and meaning. Those sentiments were borne out by a woman settler from the City of David complex who reported that “Living here is a huge privilege! It means living in a place with immense value, not only archaeological and historically, but a place with inner spiritual value, it really is the Holy Land. Living here means being plugged into eternal values.”

As a result of such attitudes, these settlers are ready to sacrifice what is most precious to them for the sake of the overarching goal. This integration of nationalistic and messianic ideas engenders a highly flammable situation, with a strong potential to set off conflict and controversy. As Dagan has noted, “Those concepts are malignant ideological growths that tend to spread lawlessness and destruction on those who cling to them – and on many others who do not.”

In tandem with the physical Jewish presence itself, are the “educational” and “informative” activities, including tours, lectures and seminars, that also form a part of the battle for hearts, minds and perceptions waged by the settler associations. They are also involved in another activity with a strong potential for danger: archaeological excavations taking place in and around the Old City. Of these, arguably the most controversial of all is the dig being carried out in

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the Muslim Quarter near the mosques of Haram al-Sharif. Intended to reveal traces of Jewish history, the excavations are damaging traces of other periods that do not match the ideological aspirations directing the work. Even more dangerous are the constant attempts to reach the remains of the ancient Jewish Temple Mount believed by Jews to be beneath the Haram Al Sahrif. Ateret Cohanim recently has been carrying out an extensive archaeological project on El Wad Street. The work, only 60-80 meters from Al Aqsa mosque and the Haram al-Sharif, can potentially plunge Jerusalem into violence. The settlers do not conceal their views over what should happen on the Temple Mount, and they are generating personal ties with messianic organizations intent on destroying the mosques and building the Third Temple. For the settlers, igniting a war between the Muslim world and the state of Israel is desirable, so as to preclude the larger war between Gog and Magog, Armageddon, and to hasten Redemption. As a result, the presence of settlers in the Old City’s Muslim quarter poses an immense danger to the public order. Superiority marks their attitudes towards their Arab neighbours, as disclosed on the Ateret Cohanim website where they describe what would have happened in the Old City if the Jews had not redeemed the land: “...the presence of dozens of dedicated, brave Jewish families and yeshiva students prevented the growth of nests of terrorists and drug dealers like in Gaza, Nablus and Ramallah”.

Seizing the space

Jewish presence in the Old City, whether a single house or an entire compound, quickly changes into a fortified area, in the finest colonial traditions of the nineteenth century. Jewish sites in the Old City typically require security fences or guard-posts with armed security personnel and often closed circuit cameras--accompanied, of course, by a provocative Israeli flag. Each Jewish house in the Old City automatically becomes a ghetto in the literal sense of the word.
- a closed community within itself, detached and alienated from its surroundings. Whenever Jews leave their home in the Old City, they are often escorted by a pair of armed security guards, attesting to the foreign, artificial and provocative nature of their presence there. In their wake come the police forces that patrol the site and are a constant irritation to Arab residents.

Conclusion

We have seen that there is a symbiotic relationship in the Old City between the Israeli government and the settler movement. The settler activities help the government forestall progress in the peace process, and the government, by diverse supportive policies and actions, facilitates the settler’s expansion in the Old City and its surroundings. In the short term, the expansion seeds guarded, isolated Jewish ghettos throughout the area. But the long term result, unless this process is reversed, will be the Judaization and de-Arabization of the Old City.
Chapter four

Future Scenarios for the Old City
Old City, Future Scenarios

In this chapter we will review a number of scenarios for the future of the Old City. Some scenarios predict escalating conflict; some project passivity on one or both sides, leading to a deterioration in the realities of the Old City; others offer the prospect of an international regime—with varying forms of interaction between it and the two parties.

The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Scenarios

The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) is an important Israeli intellectual platform dedicated to Jerusalem issues. It has produced five options for the future of the Holy Basin area, which is viewed as including the Old City.

1- Israel domination over the basin, with cultural autonomy granted to Palestinians
2- Palestinian domination over the basin, with cultural autonomy granted to Israelis
3- Division of the basin between the parties, providing that cooperation between them is ensured
4- Joint management with international support
5- International management with some authorities granted to the two parties

The JIIS group assumed that, since there is an impossibility of reaching a comprehensive solution on the issue of Jerusalem, it would be better to seek solutions in which unqualified concessions are not required from any party. Unfortunately, this rather timid approach would likely divide the space in the Old City in such a way as to considerably affect its capacity to perform the daily urban functions.

The JIIS researchers did not argue for any one specific scenario but they established the criteria by which success would be defined, the factors producing success, and the success factors related to several functional issues: *inter alia*, inhabitants, education, symbols, local administrations, security, holy sites (including the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif), economy, restoration and development, settlement of conflicts, international intervention, citizenship and the right of residence, and sovereignty.

In response to the JIIS approach, we would respectfully note that an effort to search for a solution formula that does not take into account the Israeli-biased scenario currently imposed on the city in general and the Old City in particular, is an issue in itself. Hence, this question: Is the reality imposed today by Israel a revocable fact? Would it constitute a requirement or precondition from which negotiations start? That is what happened with regard the issue of Jewish settlements inside East Jerusalem and within its surroundings. They were considered as irreversible “facts on the ground” and the Clinton criteria dealt with them according to this principle. The IPCC view of the matter is that the Israeli reality that is imposed today and the practices being witnessed by the city, whether originating directly from the state or from the settler groups that have official support, is predicted to lead to the implementation of the worst scenario—the Hebron model.

The Hebron Model Applied to Jerusalem: Worst Case Scenario

Under this scenario, the Jewish extremist settlers intensify their attempts to increase their presence in the residential areas in the Islamic and Christian quarters of the Old City. They practice a provocative policy in order to disturb Palestinian neighbors. The Israeli government supports, in a practical way, expanded settling activities, and the Israeli ministries offer diverse services and facilities for this purpose. The Israeli police intensify their security procedures to protect the settlers, and the implementation of these procedures restricts the movement and the daily lives of Palestinians. As a result, some Palestinians emigrate outside the boundaries of the Old City.

The Israeli government, through its environment protection authority, confiscates Palestinian lands in the areas surrounding the Old City, ostensibly to enforce a public parks plan. The scheme encompasses nine public parks. The government effectively follows a plan already in effect in the
City of David. It delegates de facto control of the parks to extremist settlers associations who are allowed to collect entry fees and are given an annual governmental budget to support the management of archeological sites in the parks. It is expected that these planned parks around the historical wall on its south and east perimeters will be promoted by the settlers groups as part of the packages of the tours that are offered from (Jewish) West Jerusalem. The parks will constitute an isolated region cut off from the Palestinian urban neighborhoods of the Old City, in order to avoid any spatial or functional link or contact between them.

The power of the extremist Jewish groups who are trying to revive the idea of reconstructing the Jewish Temple and replacing the mosques of Haram Al Sharif increases continuously. They begin to take over buildings in the area surrounding the western wall of Haram Al Sharif and transform them into religious schools and synagogues. An Israeli Supreme Court decision allows selected individual Jews the right to pray in Haram Al Sharif; this “legal” opening soon evolves to allow collective, group prayers, and in turn this paves the way for the use of this space for the purposes of the Third Temple construction.

This new reality increases the tension between Muslim worshipers and Jewish groups. Conflicts break out. The Israeli police protect the Jewish activities and exclude Muslims and forbid them to pray at the holy site for certain periods. The matter generates violence and incites the Arab and Islamic world against Israel. The Arab and Islamic regimes are accused by their people of not protecting Muslims and their holy shrines.

The arousal of the heated religious sentiments, and the incapacity of the Arab and Islamic governments to confront the Israelis on their actions, amplify the religious conflict and bring the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to the widest circle, i.e. a religious confessional conflict which is not limited to Palestinians and Arabs.

Excavations around and underneath Haram Al Sharif continue unabated. Palestinians consider them as the beginning of a Jewish domination over the site and as a grant of legitimacy for the division of Haram Al Sharif between Muslims and Jews, similar to the protocol for the Al Haram Al Ibrahimi Al Sharif in Hebron. The commercial activity in the Old City declines considerably due to the escalation of the conflict and heightened Israeli security procedures. This in turn increases the undeclared displacement process of Palestinians from the Old City.

According to the Israelis, this scenario does not hinder the peace process since the Palestinian neighborhoods can have their functions and daily responsibilities controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and negotiations will be made about the status of the Old City in a subsequent phase.

A rapid regression of affairs accompanies the escalation of the conflict in the Old City and reduces the opportunities of reaching a comprehensive peace treaty between Palestinians and Israelis and between Israel and Islamic Arab states.

This scenario, resulting from the deterioration of the current situation and the impossibility of erasing the Islamic and Christian Arab identity of the Old City and its surroundings, constitutes the onset of a total confrontation leading to wars and to a long-term conflict between Israel and many Arab and Islamic nations.

Options and Alternatives of Geopolitical Scenarios for the Future of Jerusalem

Below we present five IPCC scenarios that vary according to the degree of internation participation and the placement of sovereignty.

1- International management and sovereignty of the Old City within a special system, i.e. limiting the resolution of the general assembly Res. no.181 for the year 1947 to the Old City only. This scenario grants an international special regime the authority to administer the Old City and allows participation of both parties in the setup of arrangements. This option, regardless of the extent of its enforceability, is not viewed as a permanent solution but rather an interim arrangement. The participation of the parties in setting up the final arrangements...
for sovereignty and management of the old city remains necessary.

2- A Palestinian-Israeli joint sovereignty over the entire Old City, with or without defining the sovereignty powers zones of each party. This option requires a high level of cooperation between the conflict parties in order to define the form of management that will ensure services to the Old City residents and its visitors.

3- A division of the sovereignty by which the Old City shall be totally under Palestinian sovereignty, except for the Jewish Quarter. One of the expected difficulties in this arrangement is the issue of sovereignty over the Armenian Quarter, which Israel has wanted to preserve (according to their position at Camp David) in order to guarantee the geographic continuity between West Jerusalem and the Jewish Quarter. In addition, the Israeli definition of the Old Jerusalem is not restricted to inside the ancient walls. Israel wishes in any future solution to preserve its sovereignty over several regions surrounding the Old City, especially the City of David in Silwan and the Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives.

4- A non-sovereign region in which there is no display of any sovereign symbol from any party in the Old City. Under this scenario the Old City would be administrated by both parties, with or without the participation of international parties.

5- Israeli sovereignty over the Old City and its immediate surroundings in a comprehensive way, and the reduction of the Palestinian presence. Recently, more and more Israeli voices have called for the preservation of the Old City and the elimination of the Palestinian demographic concentration.

Table 4.1 Five IPCC scenarios for the Old City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Inhabitants (per thousand)</th>
<th>Political reality</th>
<th>Spatial relation with the Palestinian state</th>
<th>Area in dunams</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internationalization/ special international system</td>
<td>33,000 Palestinians; 4,000 Israelis</td>
<td>Foreign international authority administers the old city in a separate way from the sovereignty of both parties.</td>
<td>Isolated region is subject to control and sovereignty of international bodies.</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>International citizenship or citizenship related to each sovereign state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint sovereignty</td>
<td>33,000 Palestinians; 4,000 Israelis</td>
<td>Joint sovereign authority of both parties with the division of authorities and responsibilities.</td>
<td>Contact with the space surrounding the old city is subject to the considerations of the status of the joint sovereignty.</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Citizenship or residence status and/or affiliation of each national group to the mother sovereign state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of sovereignty (Jewish Quarter under Israeli sovereignty and the rest of the Old City under Palestinian sovereignty)</td>
<td>Each party is responsible for the zone that is subject to its sovereignty.</td>
<td>Each sovereign zone is in contact with the rest of sovereign zones of each state.</td>
<td>778 under Palestinian sovereignty including the Armenian Quarter (126 dunams);</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Palestinian citizenship for Palestinians and Israeli citizenship for Israelis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-sovereign zone for any party</td>
<td>Special system without sovereign meanings inside the old city for any of the conflict parties.</td>
<td>Isolated region subject to control and sovereignty of international bodies.</td>
<td>900 with the possibility of annexing.</td>
<td>Citizenship of each state according to the national affiliation or special status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Israeli sovereignty over the Old City and its surroundings within the Israeli definition of the “holy basin” (City of David in Silwan and the Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives)</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of Palestinians in the Old City.</td>
<td>Reinforcement of Israeli domination over the Old City and its surroundings.</td>
<td>Isolation of the Old City from its Palestinian surroundings, including Palestinian city neighborhoods or suburbs and the rest of the West Bank regions.</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Imposition of the Israeli citizenship on Palestinians or preservation of the resident status without granting the rights of citizenship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Administration

The five IPCC scenarios summarized above would require further analysis in order to identify their spatial and functional dimensions and effects. The general description of these options only identifies the possible realities that could flow from the current conditions of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the IPCC team wanted to examine in further detail the possible options of the special international system to which the Old City might be subjected within some future solution. Thus we decided to examine the options of dealing with the current situation under a solution characterized by the domination of the international community. We arrived at narratives for three scenarios based on two assumptions: a two-state solution has been agreed; an international body oversees the Old City. The scenarios depict three situations of what most likely would develop under those assumptions:

Spiraling Tension—an Old City that spins out of control under an international administration that is focused on broad concerns; Social Withdrawal—Palestinians remain diffident in the face of an Old City international administration that ignores the material needs of the Palestinians while focusing on security matters and preserving the religious status quo; Successful Engagement—an Old City that is revived by an energetic international commitment to success.

Spiraling Tension Scenario: Neglect, Confrontation, Violence

The scene on the ground

There is no improvement in the economic or social conditions in the Old City, and the services provided remain very substandard, especially in the Muslim Quarter.

The international authority does not engage in even minimal dialogue with the leadership of the neighborhoods, and there is almost no interaction between the majority of the Palestinians and the international administration. The attention of this administration is on legal and political formulas at a high level, a focus related to the role of the two states and the regulations of administrating and monitoring the holy places. Community development and security and the material and social needs of the residents are not attended to.

The only public space for the majority Muslims continues to be the Haram Al-Sharif. There, the public discourse denounces non-Muslim, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim regimes that are loyal to the west. The Palestinians come to consider the international regime as the new crusaders working against the Arab Muslim existence for the advantage of Israel.

The national tensions increase on both sides; extremist Jewish groups intensify their effort to colonize the Old City by controlling more Arab houses and property especially in the Muslim quarter; the provocation of settler groups visiting the Haram Al-Sharif and the Muslim Quarter becomes a major source of unrest and violent confrontation.

Soon, the unrest spreads beyond the city walls. The Palestinian State (in the West Bank and Gaza) and Palestinian citizens of Israel demonstrate against the Old City Jewish settler activities and complain that the international regime is not intervening to stop the provocation and attacks of the Jewish settlers. The international administration is widely viewed by the Palestinians as unfairly favoring the Jewish side.

Young Muslim religious groups organize in cells against the Jewish settlers; many Jewish settlers are pursued by youths brandishing knives. Eventually these attacks are directed against all Israeli pedestrians and even tourists. Ultimately, the representatives of the international administration come under armed attack.

The state of Israel issues an ultimatum to the international regime to stop the attacks against Israeli civilians and to arrest the responsible groups. But before the ultimatum can be responded to, Israeli security forces enter the Old City and kill and arrest Palestinians for their actions against Israelis.

The security situation forces the international parties to bar all outsiders from entering the Old
City, whether visitors, tourists, or worshipers coming to pray. This marks the beginning of a general escalation of the conflict. Mass demonstrations breakout in many Arab and Muslim capitals; voices are raised against Israel and the international regime.

A Society in Withdrawal Scenario

The scene on the ground
The passivity of the Palestinians that was witnessed previously under Israeli occupation control continues to characterize their relationship with the new international regime. They refuse to deal with the administration in an open way, limiting their interaction mainly to registering as Old City residents and paying taxes. Civil society languishes.

The individualistic, every-man-for-himself survival mentality persists and the harsh socio-economic conditions continue for the majority of the population of the Old City. Huge gaps develop between Old City Palestinians and the West Bankers: the latter benefit immensely from the peace that came with statehood, but this prosperity has passed the Old City Palestinian quarters by.

The Old City has only a limited capacity to reap the peace and statehood benefits. Thus the economic transformation elsewhere deepens the resignation of the Palestinians in the Old City; they remain passive and pessimistic in their dealings with the international administration.

The lack of employment within the Old City and the limited economic benefits and opportunities force Palestinians to emigrate to other parts of East Jerusalem and to cities of the West Bank.

Poverty in the Old City increases in contrast to the prosperity outside the walls. Extremists emerge and the international regime is considered as a new crusader occupation replacing the Israeli version. The international administration has almost no influence on the daily life of Palestinians.

In lieu of attending to the socio-economic needs of the residents, the international administration focuses on security and preserving the religious status quo.

For the Israelis, the fact that the international administration is managing the issue of security makes the regime more accepted. The population in the Jewish Quarter witnesses a major increase in real estate values: only rich religious Jews from the Diaspora can afford to buy homes in the Jewish Quarter.

Initially, the Old City draws the attention of international organizations. They are at first interested in locating in the Old City, but the lack of space and the bad housing conditions discourage them. Most of the international organizations and NGOs situate themselves in areas around the Old City.

The Palestinian residents of the Old City become increasingly isolated. The ties between them and the rest of the city and the West Bank weaken due to the widening socio-economic gap between them. And there is a low level of interaction between the Old City and the international administration and with the organizations established in the newly emerged state to support the peace transformation between the two national groups.

Social problems of drug addiction, crime and violence among families increases and become among the highest in the region.

The informal traditional customary laws are the only rules applied in the conduct of Old City Palestinian affairs; the local leadership is organized by families and their interaction with their surroundings is also dictated by family and clan affiliation.

Friction and tension at national and religious events is a common issue. But this tension is manageable and violence remains at a low level—due to the international administration’s preoccupation with security and the maintenance
Successful Engagement Scenario: Cooperation and Integration

The scene on the ground
The international regime considers the social fabric of the Old City as a major venue for action. They identify and interact with the civil organizations and with the informal leadership of the community. They develop sensitivities to the structure of the society, the needs of the people, and the urban needs of the community.

The administration approaches urban functions not merely as vehicles for the provision of services but as mechanisms to improve the quality of life and to enhance their relationship with the public spaces and community institutions. Urban functions are seen as a means of supporting the identity and the image of a peaceful Jerusalem. Urban functions and utilities are provided by various companies and the two national authorities but, importantly, they are controlled and managed by the international administration. As the functionality, identity, and image of the Old City improve, the socio-economic conditions of the residents advance markedly.

The diversity present in the Israeli society at large begins to influence the functions and the type of population living in and interacting with the Old City. The power of the fanatic religious and national groups has significantly diminished and they no longer dominate the Jewish Quarter or the Old City landscape and urban fabric.

In the Palestinian society of the Old City formal social structures emerge (similar to the trends occurring in Palestinian society at whole).

Economic and social mobility facilitate the transformation from traditional informal conservative social structures to a community with a vibrant and organized civil society. Planning, renovation and excavations are under conducted under the full authority of the international special regime and done according to the UNESCO protocols, with a representation of the national and local governments from both sides.

A sense of ownership (facilitated by clear definitions of private, public and semipublic spaces) and of citizenship (Palestinian citizens with special status under the international administration) awakens within the Palestinian Old City residents and reduces tensions and creates a communal sense and an integrative cooperative mode with the international regime and its mechanisms. The international community registers ownership of property and designates the use of the properties to protect the rights of the owners and the community.

Interaction and integration among and between the communities evolves through a positive process. The international administration policies succeed in creating a positive interaction and a different type of social fabric, one that reflects the new image of Jerusalem as a city of both national and global value.

The relation between the Old City and the rest of the city is characterized by a strong integration, and the Old City becomes a real living museum.

It becomes a model of peace and positive interaction between different cultures and religions. It assumes a role of global importance and is recognized as a city of prosperity.

The Old City begins to attract rich Palestinian residents, and international organizations maintain symbolic offices there. Spaces for this function were found in the northeast and northwest areas of the Old City.

The Old City hosts international organizations, think tanks, and universities with programs that deal with conflict resolution and peace transformation. The Old City becomes a model of inspiration and the only model of ethno-national and global peace.

Conclusion
The present Israeli encroachment on and domination of the Old City and its holy basin surroundings differs from the manner in which they have dealt with East Jerusalem neighborhoods outside the ancient walls. They have sought to consolidate certain neighborhoods and to divide others on demographic grounds in order to capitalize on the Clintonian general principle: “Where there are Israelis belongs to Israel; where there are Palestinians belongs to the Palestinians.” In contrast, in the Old City the Israelis have had an intense interest in centralization. They seek to make the ancient center the heart of the Israeli state and the Jewish people. This goal has been positioned by numerous Israeli governments, including the current administration, as beyond compromise. However, in order to move forward from this stalemate and the inherent risks in the status quo, which leads to the worst case scenario, it is necessary to seek new ideas that draw concessions from both parties. Of the many scenarios reviewed in this chapter, the one that proffers the greatest progress embraces Israeli and Palestinian cooperation and integration under an international regime.
Jerusalem Old City: Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications

Appendices
Appendix One

Current conditions, Public and Social Services, Organization and Issues in the Old City

I. Current Conditions

• Area and population
  o Total area is 0.91 km²
  o Population 36,965 (2007)

• Division
  o Four quarters: area and population
    • Islamic quarter: 0.461 km² (51.1%), 26,544 (71.81%)
    • Christian quarter: 0.192 km² (21.3%), 5,442 (14.72%)
    • Armenian quarter: 0.126 km² (14%), 2,424 (6.55%)
    • Jewish quarter: 0.122 km² (13.6%), 2,555 (6.92%)

• Land ownership
  o Islamic Trust property: 0.2197 km² (25%)
  o Church property: 0.2724 km² (31%)
  o Private property: 0.2021 km² (23%)
  o State property: 0.1845 km² (21%)

• Land use
  o Residential: 0.45 km² - 5748 residential units
  o Religious: 0.280 km² - 29 Mosques, 70 churches and convents, 22 synagogues and yeshivas
  o Commercial: 0.08 km² - 16 commercial areas
  o Archeological sites: 0.05 km² - 28 archeological sites dating back 5000 years
  o Unused space: 0.04 km²

• Inhabitants
  o Average family size: 6.3 persons in the Muslim quarter
  o Density and living standard: Highest population density is in the Muslim quarter which is coupled with the lowest living standards; lowest population density is in the Armenian quarter; Jewish quarter has the highest living standards
  o Emigration: the departure of the social and economic elite from the Old City, as well as the Christian Palestinians
  o Age: more than two thirds of the Old City population is under the age of 25
  o Jewish settlers: approximately 80 families and 600 yeshiva students reside in the Muslim and Christian quarters
  o Political affiliation is mostly Fateh, but rivals are emerging
  o Sixty-four percent of the Old City families are under the poverty level
  o Seventy-six percent of the Old City’s children are under the poverty level.

• Residential units
  o Islamic quarter: 3,389
  o Christian quarter: 1,210
  o Armenian quarter: 593
  o Jewish quarter: 556
  o Total: 5748

• Residential units size
  o 60% of residential units in the Muslim quarter average 40 sq. m. in size; 25% of residential units in the Muslim quarter average 20 sq. m. in size
  o Average residential unit size in Palestinian quarters is 42.2 sq. m., average residential unit size in the Jewish quarter is 72.9 sq. m.
  o 40% of housing units are comprised of only one room

• Residential units types
  o Apartments: 62.4%
  o Houses: 32.4%
  o Rooms: 5.2%

• Residential units ownership
  o Islamic or Christian Trust: 31.4%
  o Private property: 25%
  o Rented from Islamic or Christian Trust: 44.6% (61% of all Christian residential units are Christian Trust)

• Housing conditions:
  o High density in the Islamic quarter
    Islamic quarter 80.67 persons per dunam
    Christian quarter 27.6 person per dunam
Armenian quarter 17.06 persons per dunam
Jewish quarter 19.26 persons per dunam

- High humidity
- Lack of windows due to urban density, causing lack of ventilation and lighting
- Lack of sanitary amenities like bathrooms, kitchens, waste water management, etc...

II. Utilities, Public Services, Infrastructure, and Structures

- Utilities
  - Lighting: almost all the secondary streets are not well lit, except for those in the Jewish Quarter.
  - Water Supply: provided by Gihon, an Israeli company, to all quarters, conditions of pipe system are deteriorated
    - 29.5% of housing units have exterior water piping
    - 8% of housing units share water pipes
  - Waste Collection and Treatment: provided by Gihon, an Israeli company, to all quarters. Fees for waste water management are paid annually through the Arnona (a tax based on residence in a building), conditions of pipe system are deteriorated
  - Garbage Collection: the municipality of Jerusalem is responsible for this service, and has two systems. The first system is in the Jewish quarter, where the municipality directly collects garbage from garbage containers and removes it. The second system is in the Palestinian neighborhoods, where the municipality indirectly collects garbage through private contracting of garbage collectors. However, there are no garbage containers so the residents have to place their garbage in plastic bags outside their doors. The collectors place the garbage in piles in selected areas in each neighborhood, then it is compressed and moved with small tractors outside of the city walls—7 to 8 times a day (30 tons of garbage per day). Finally, the municipality collects the garbage from Damascus and Lions gates
  - Electricity: provided by two companies, IEC for the Jewish quarter and JDECO for the other three sectors. JDECO provides 25 million kw for 6055 consumer units. Almost all buildings are provided with electricity, but there is a dire need for replacing many old cables. There is a lack of distribution points due to lack of space; a high percentage of unpaid charges 45.8% and difficulty in maintenance because electric company workers must obtain a permit from the municipality to work within the Old City. Adding to this difficulty is the interweaving of electrical cables with the telecommunication, water and waste pipe systems.
  - Gas Power: the Old City is provided with 70 gas containers every 3 days, brought in with carts from all the city gates. The gas is provided from an Israeli company located in the industrial settlement of Atarot.
  - Telecommunications: Bezeq, an Israeli phone company, provides phone and internet services to the Old City; conditions of cable system are acceptable

- Public Services
  - Public Transportation: 3 bus stops which are all in the Jewish quarter
  - Public Parking: 3 parking areas; 2 in the Jewish quarter and one in the Muslim quarter
  - Open Areas: generally are very small; there are open areas on the grounds of holy places in all the quarters, as well as one open space in the Islamic neighborhood and another in the Jewish neighborhood
  - Health Centers: 5 health centers and 3 pharmacies; no hospital
  - Educational System:
    - 1 Municipal Pedagogy Administration office
    - 17 Palestinian schools (1 of which is an industrial school)
    - 2 schools under the municipality of Jerusalem (1 of which is an industrial school)
    - 7000 Palestinian students in 263 classes with 450 teachers
    - 4 kindergartens, 150 students
    - 5 religious schools in the Jewish Quarter, 400 students
• Jewish pre-military Aderet Eliyahu school located in the Muslim Quarter
  o Post Offices: 1
  o Public Street Sanitation: 2 offices
  o Banks: 1, in the Jewish Quarter
  o Social and Cultural Centers
    • Approximately 20 Palestinian organizations, including:
      o Al Saraya for Women
      o African Presence
      o Orthodox Club (Christian)
      o Arab Catholics
      o De La Salle (Christian)
      o Al Laq Laq Tower
    • Jewish organizations include:
      o Sfaradic Education Center
      o Safer Center
      o Heritage House
      o Jerusalem Seminar
      o Archeological Seminar
      o Guesthouse of Religious Students from Abroad
      o Bitar House
      o Ariel Center
      o Western Wall Heritage Center
      o Jewish Quarter Community Center
      o Rashel Yanit Ben Tzvi
      o Bar Ilan University House

• Road Network and Traffic Patterns
  o Streets: new and developed only in the Jewish Quarter
  o Access: most roads are inaccessible by vehicles because they are too narrow and the Old City is somewhat hilly. Vehicles are allowed entrance only through 3 gates: Lions gate, New gate, and Jaffa gate (exiting from Dung gate)
  o Damascus Gate North – south axis
    • Begins at Damascus gate and ends at Zion gate
    • 1 km long
    • The most crowded area in the city because it has the major markets
    • Used mainly by Palestinians residing or working in the Old City
    • Muslims use this route on their daily and Friday prayers, and during Muslim festivals
  o Ultra-Orthodox Jews use this route on Friday evenings and during Shabbat prayer times, as well as on Jewish holidays, but avoid it during times of tension
  o Tourists use this route, primarily those who stay in East Jerusalem hotels
  o Al Wad road axis
    • Begins inside the Muslim quarter, near Damascus gate; then turns to the east and runs north - south
    • Major route used by Muslims and Jews to Haram Al Sharif and the western wall
    • There are several Jewish settlements on this road, including one for Sharon
  o Jaffa gate west – east axis
    • Begins at Jaffa gate and ends at Chain gate of Haram Al Sharif
    • This route is the meeting place between East and West Jerusalem, and is the meeting point between Christian, Muslim and Armenian quarters
    • The only vehicular route to the Jewish quarter
    • Pilgrims and tourist use this route since it leads to Haram Al Sharif, the Holy Sepulcher and the western wall
    • Lined with commercial stores
    • High traffic during Christian and Jewish holidays
    • Palestinians working in West Jerusalem use this route
  o Jaffa gate Zion gate Dung gate route
    • The sole vehicular route to the Jewish quarter
    • Primary route to the Armenian quarter
    • Closed for vehicles on weekends
  o Lions gate – Haram Al Sharif route
    • Shortest route to Haram Al Sharif without crossing the Old City
    • Used by worshippers arriving by bus and for one day visits
  o Dung gate – western wall route
    • Shortest route to the western wall without crossing the Old City
    • Primary vehicular traffic exit for Jewish quarter
    • Used by Palestinians going to and from Silwan
  o New gate
Jerusalem Old City: Urban Fabric and Geopolitical Implications

• Provides vehicular traffic to the Christian quarter
• Closest gate to West Jerusalem
  o Herod’s gate
  • Primarily used by residents of the Muslim quarter

• Social services
  o Formal organizations:
    • Center for Social Work
    • Caritas
    • Welfare Association
    • Medical Relief Association (in Al Sa’diyeh): Austrian funding
    • Pope Fund for Old City House Renovation
    • Sons of Jerusalem: Municipal funding
    • Alwen School for Special Needs: Municipal funding
    • Old City Youth Association: PA and EU funding
    • Agricultural Relief Society: leftist Palestinian funding
    • Isabford (in Al Sa’diyeh): American funding
    • Community Work Center: Canadian funding
    • Nidal for Youth: leftist Palestinian funding
    • UNRWA
    • Islamic Waqf organization

• Employment Sector: Human capital of persons above 15 years of age is 61.6% in the Palestinian quarters.
  o 22% work in the Old City
  o 43% work in East Jerusalem outside city walls
  o 29% work in Israel
  o 5% work in the West Bank
  o 0.7% unspecified
  o Unemployment varies between 29 – 50%
  o Low percentage of working women

• Security and law enforcement
  o Police Departments: Israeli police are responsible for most of the security in the Old City. There are 6 police stations; 4 of which are in the Islamic quarter (one is located on the Al Haram Ash Sharif grounds), 1 in the Jewish quarter and 1 in the Armenian quarter. The Israeli police do not deal with crime within the local community of Palestinian neighborhoods. The policing is largely reduced to counter-terror, protection of tourists and Jewish settlers, dealing with trans-national drug trafficking and the maintenance of order at the holy sites
  o Private Security: private security companies like Modi’in Ezrachi are responsible for escorting Jewish settlers around the Old City. There is an unarmed security force assigned by the Islamic Trust department for the Haram Al Sharif grounds, but it has no official authority
  o Security Cameras: there are cameras placed in troublesome streets.
  o Fire Department: the firefighters center in Wadi Al Joz serve the Old City; fire hydrants are provided by Gihon

• Buildings
  o Traditional and Historic Buildings
    • Commercial: 1679 (45%)
    • Public: 118 (3%)
    • Religious: 243 (6.5%)
    • Residential: 1582 (43%)
    • Undefined: 96 (2.5%)
    • Total: 3718 buildings
  o Type of Value of Traditional and Historic Buildings
    • Architectural: 405 (11%)
    • Authentic: 228 (6%)
    • Historical: 1747 (47%)
    • Political: 185 (5%)
    • Religious: 153 (4%)
    • Undefined: 1000 (27%)
  o Rate of Use of Buildings
    • Abandoned: 325 (9%)
    • Closed: 37 (1%)
    • Completely: 3139 (85%)
    • Uninhabited: 1 (0.03%)
    • Partially inhabited: 162 (4%)
    • Unknown: 29 (0.8%)
  o Zoning Bylaws: set by the Municipality of Jerusalem, but are currently chaotic and unregulated. Building permits: set by the municipality of Jerusalem
APPENDIX

- Building Permits: set by the municipality of Jerusalem
- Old City components
  - Buildings: 8,245 (44%)
  - Courtyards: 890 (4.3%)
  - Jewish quarter: no data (6.5%)
  - Public plaza: 1,772 (9%)
  - Public plaza – unregistered: 147 (1%)
  - Settlers: 355 (1.8%)
  - Wall: 60 (0.3%)
  - Unknown: 6,151 (33%)
- Enterprises: the commercial shops represent 45% of the Old City services
- Hotels: a total of four hotels and eleven hostels operate in the Muslim and Christian quarters.
- Renovation and Rehabilitation: 20.5% of housing in the Old City is not fit to live in, 29.5% of housing is in need of renovation, and 11.4% of housing is in need of expansion, while only 18.1% of housing is considered adequate.

Current issues:

- Residential Issues in Muslim and Christian Quarters:
  o Environment and pollution, garbage collection
  o High urban and population densities
  o Inefficient housing
  o High property tax
  o Inefficient infrastructure: electricity, water, waste water
  o Lack of parking areas for residents
  o High noise levels
  o Garbage piling due to lack of garbage containers
  o Waste water management
  o Humidity and lack of ventilation causing molding
  o High population density
  o Lack of green space
- Commercial Issues in Muslim and Christian Quarters:
  o Very low wages
  o Lack of security
  o The separation wall reduces customers
  o Lack of investment
  o Jewish guides ignore Palestinian shops
  o Depressed tourist shops must take on non-tourist products to survive
- Social Issues in Muslim and Christian Quarters:
  o Spread of drugs
  o Isolation from the West Bank
  o Child labor
  o School fleeing
  o High poverty
  o High crime level: family violence, sexual abuse, drug use, petty crimes
  o Early marriage among females
  o Social and psychological pressures on females
  o Excess spare time for youth
  o Settlements causing friction
  o Settlement security muddling movement of Palestinian residents
  o Continuous military siege
  o Deteriorating security
  o High unemployment
  o Negative migration of organizations, middleclass and Christian families
  o The negative image of the Old City
  o Israeli forcing the Jewish character on the Old City
  o Lack of awareness and engagement in protecting the Arab character in the Old City
  o Deterioration of services provided by organizations
  o Lack of youth and entertainment centers
  o Lack of centers and facilities for children
  o Lack of centers for the elderly
  o Lack of community and social programs
  o Deteriorating educational system
  o Deteriorating environment
  o Lack of public awareness
  o Lack of public space
## Appendix Two

### SURVEY OF JEWISH PROPERTIES IN OLD CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Settlers Properties</th>
<th>Location -Street</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Near Herod’s Gate</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>4-5 Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Al Qadisia (in front of school)</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>2 Families (Baruh &amp; Simhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Aqbat Rahabat</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>2-3 Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>El Bustani 4</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>4 Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>(Behind Austrian hospice)</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>5-6 Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sharon house</td>
<td>Al Wad St.</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>3-4 Settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>House under construction</td>
<td>El Jabshe St.</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>El Kanais St.</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>2 families; 6-8 Singles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Al Wad-Bab el Hadid</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>For the security guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Al Wad St.</td>
<td>Ateret Cohanim</td>
<td>2 Families, 4 Singles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Beit Hazon/Beit Hamaarabim</td>
<td>Aqbat Khalidihya</td>
<td>Atara Le Joshna</td>
<td>4 Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Zedekihau Cave</td>
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Sources

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